Introduction
This essay examines the debate between realist and constructivist perspectives on the non-use of chemical weapons, with particular focus on the Syrian case. Realists maintain that states refrain from employing such weapons primarily due to their limited battlefield effectiveness rather than any normative prohibition. Constructivists, by contrast, argue that a deeply embedded international norm rooted in political culture renders chemical weapons morally unacceptable. The Syrian civil war, during which chemical weapons were deployed on multiple occasions, appears at first glance to support the realist position. However, closer analysis reveals that the international reaction, the attempts at concealment by the Syrian government, and the broader pattern of stigmatisation demonstrate the enduring strength of the norm. The discussion draws on established scholarship in international security to evaluate these competing claims.
The Realist Objection and Its Application to Syria
Realist accounts emphasise material factors in state behaviour. From this viewpoint, chemical weapons possess drawbacks including unpredictable wind effects, the risk of blowback onto friendly forces, and the need for specialised delivery systems. Consequently, rational actors are said to avoid them unless a clear tactical advantage emerges. The Syrian episodes, particularly the 2017 Khan Shaykhun incident and subsequent reported uses, are cited by realists as evidence that once utility was identified in asymmetric warfare against entrenched opponents, the weapons were employed. This interpretation frames the Syrian government’s actions as a straightforward calculation of costs and benefits, with the norm exerting little independent influence.
Constructivist Counterarguments: Normative Stigmatisation and Political Culture
Constructivist scholars contend that norms shape what counts as appropriate behaviour, thereby influencing interests themselves. The chemical weapons taboo, as Price (1997) demonstrates, emerged from a process of moral and legal prohibition dating back to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and reinforced after the First World War. This prohibition acquired a quality of “civilisational” revulsion that distinguishes chemical agents from other means of warfare. In the Syrian context, even repeated violations do not erase the norm; rather, they illustrate its resilience. The Syrian regime consistently denied responsibility and attempted to obscure evidence, behaviour consistent with actors who recognise they are breaching a widely shared expectation. Had chemical weapons been regarded as ordinary munitions, such elaborate efforts at concealment would have been unnecessary.
International Responses and the Reinforcement of the Norm
The widespread condemnation following documented attacks further illustrates the norm’s embeddedness. Western states, regional actors and international organisations expressed outrage that exceeded reactions to comparable conventional attacks. The subsequent United States cruise-missile strike in April 2017, justified partly in terms of upholding a universal prohibition, indicates that violation carried political costs. These responses cannot be reduced to material interests alone; they reflect a shared understanding that chemical weapons remain outside the boundaries of acceptable conduct. Even states that refrained from military intervention still participated in diplomatic isolation and sanctions regimes, actions that sustained the normative framework rather than merely pursuing immediate strategic advantage.
Limitations of Purely Material Explanations
A purely realist reading struggles to account for why the Syrian government did not escalate to larger-scale or repeated chemical attacks once initial utility had been demonstrated. Instead, after 2013 and again after 2017, Damascus largely returned to conventional methods despite ongoing military challenges. This restraint suggests that anticipated reputational and political penalties, themselves products of the pre-existing taboo, continued to exert influence. Moreover, the norm’s strength is evident in the fact that other conflict parties, including non-state actors, largely avoided chemical weapons despite access to precursor chemicals, an outcome difficult to explain through battlefield utility alone.
Conclusion
The Syrian case does not refute the existence of a chemical weapons norm; it underscores how deeply that norm is rooted in international political culture. While realist objections correctly identify instances of violation linked to perceived military necessity, the pattern of denial, international opprobrium and selective restraint demonstrates that the taboo retains causal weight. Constructivist analysis therefore provides a more complete account by showing that states continue to operate within a framework that treats chemical weapons as qualitatively different from other armaments.
References
- Price, R. (1997) The Chemical Weapons Taboo. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Tannenwald, N. (2007) The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization, 52(4), pp. 887–917.
- United Nations (2017) Report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. New York: United Nations.
