Introduction
Thomas Aquinas’s account of religious language represents a central contribution to medieval philosophy and theology. In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas contends that terms applied to God cannot be used univocally or equivocally and must instead be understood analogically. This essay examines Aquinas’s argument for analogy, outlines its principal features, and assesses whether his position successfully resolves the difficulties associated with speaking about the divine. While Aquinas offers a coherent middle way between anthropomorphism and complete agnosticism, his theory encounters significant philosophical challenges that limit its overall success.
Aquinas’s Rejection of Univocal and Equivocal Language
Aquinas begins by considering how human beings can predicate attributes of God. He argues that univocal predication is impossible because God’s being differs fundamentally from created being. If terms such as ‘good’ or ‘wise’ applied to God in exactly the same sense as they apply to creatures, divine transcendence would be compromised. Conversely, purely equivocal predication would render theological statements meaningless, since no connection would exist between human concepts and divine reality. Aquinas therefore rejects both extremes in favour of analogical predication, which preserves both the distinction between God and creatures and the intelligibility of religious discourse (Aquinas, 1265–1274).
The Doctrine of Analogy
Aquinas distinguishes two principal forms of analogy: analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality. In the former, a term is applied primarily to one reality and secondarily to another in virtue of a relationship of dependence; thus, ‘healthy’ is said primarily of an animal and secondarily of its food. Applied to God, terms such as ‘good’ are predicated primarily of God and secondarily of creatures insofar as creatures participate in divine goodness. Analogy of proportionality, by contrast, compares relations rather than things themselves: human goodness stands to human nature as divine goodness stands to divine nature. Through these forms of analogy, Aquinas maintains that religious language conveys genuine, albeit limited, knowledge of God without reducing the divine to creaturely categories. The approach therefore appears to secure both intelligibility and reverence in theological speech.
Strengths of Aquinas’s Position
Aquinas’s theory offers several advantages. It avoids the anthropomorphism implicit in univocal language by insisting that divine attributes exceed the limitations of their human counterparts. At the same time, it counters the radical agnosticism often associated with equivocal language by preserving a proportional relationship between creaturely and divine perfections. This balance enables believers to affirm statements such as ‘God is good’ without claiming exhaustive comprehension of divine goodness. Furthermore, the doctrine coheres with Aquinas’s broader metaphysics of participation, in which creatures derive their perfections from God as their source. Consequently, analogy provides a philosophically integrated framework that links language, metaphysics, and theology.
Criticisms and Limitations
Nevertheless, Aquinas’s account faces notable objections. Critics argue that the distinction between analogy and equivocation remains insufficiently clear, leaving open the possibility that analogical predication ultimately collapses into equivocation. Duns Scotus, for instance, maintained that some concepts must apply univocally to God and creatures if theological claims are to possess determinate meaning. Later philosophers, influenced by Kantian epistemology, have questioned whether human concepts can be extended analogically beyond the realm of possible experience without losing referential content. Moreover, modern philosophers of religion such as D.Z. Phillips have suggested that Aquinas’s theory imposes an overly theoretical model on religious language, which functions primarily within lived practices rather than metaphysical schemes. These critiques indicate that, although Aquinas’s position is logically consistent within its own framework, it does not conclusively demonstrate the necessity or sufficiency of analogy for all religious discourse.
Conclusion
Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy constitutes a sophisticated attempt to navigate the difficulties of religious language by steering between univocity and equivocity. It successfully integrates theological predication with a participatory metaphysics and preserves both divine transcendence and the meaningfulness of statements about God. However, persistent philosophical objections concerning clarity, referential force, and the nature of religious practice suggest that the theory does not offer a wholly successful demonstration. While analogy remains a valuable resource within Thomistic thought, its capacity to resolve the problems of religious language in a definitive manner remains open to legitimate dispute.
References
- Aquinas, T. (1265–1274) Summa Theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1947). New York: Benziger Brothers.
- Davies, B. (1992) The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scotus, J.D. (c.1300) Ordinatio. Translated by A. Wolter (1987). Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett.
