Introduction
This essay examines Garrett Hardin’s influential account of resource degradation in his 1968 essay on the tragedy of the commons. It then considers Elinor Ostrom’s empirical findings on common-pool resource institutions and assesses whether, and why, they modify Hardin’s conclusions. The discussion draws on core texts in environmental political science to evaluate both arguments at an undergraduate level.
Hardin’s Explanation of Resource Degradation
Hardin (1968) maintained that individuals sharing an unregulated pasture will each maximise personal gain by adding more livestock. Because the costs of overgrazing are shared while benefits remain private, rational actors continue this behaviour until the resource collapses. Hardin therefore viewed open-access commons as inherently prone to overuse. To avert ruin he advocated either privatisation, which internalises costs, or coercive state administration that imposes limits on users.
Ostrom’s Challenge Through Empirical Cases
Ostrom (1990) questioned the inevitability of Hardin’s tragedy by studying long-enduring irrigation systems, fisheries and forests. She identified design principles—clear boundaries, proportional sanctions, collective-choice arrangements and conflict-resolution mechanisms—that enable users to monitor one another and sustain yields without external ownership or central direction. These findings demonstrate that under specified institutional conditions, appropriators can overcome collective-action problems that Hardin regarded as insurmountable.
Continuities and Modifications
Ostrom accepted Hardin’s diagnosis of the incentive structure but rejected his binary prescription. Where Hardin saw only private property or state control, Ostrom’s evidence showed that nested, self-organised regimes frequently achieve sustainable outcomes at lower transaction costs than either alternative (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 58–102). Thus her work refines rather than refutes Hardin: it narrows the scope of the tragedy to situations lacking credible commitment devices while enlarging the policy repertoire available to environmental governance.
Conclusion
Hardin identified a powerful logic of degradation yet overstated its universality. Ostrom’s comparative studies reveal that appropriate institutions can mitigate the tragedy, thereby broadening theoretical and practical options in environmental political science.
References
- Hardin, G. (1968) ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, 162(3859), pp. 1243-1248.
- Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
