International order has been shaped significantly by the United Nations since its foundation in 1945. This essay examines whether the UN continues to occupy a central position in contemporary global affairs through the analytical lenses of realism and liberalism. Drawing primarily on the selected sources, the discussion first outlines realist arguments that emphasise great-power politics and institutional weakness. It then considers liberal viewpoints that stress cooperation, interdependence and institutional relevance. The analysis evaluates these perspectives to clarify the UN’s current role before concluding that the organisation retains influence yet faces structural constraints which limit its centrality.
Realist Perspectives: Power Politics and Institutional Limits
Realist theory views international relations as occurring within an anarchic system where states pursue survival and power. From this standpoint, the United Nations cannot function as the true centre of order because it lacks independent authority. Mearsheimer (2001) argues that great powers dominate institutions and that the UN Security Council primarily reflects the distribution of material capabilities among its permanent members. When these powers disagree, as seen in repeated vetoes over Syria and Ukraine, the organisation is paralysed. Consequently, states rely on their own military and diplomatic resources rather than UN mechanisms.
Grieco (1988) extends this critique by highlighting the limits of cooperation under anarchy. Even when states join multilateral forums, they remain wary of relative gains. The UN’s collective security provisions therefore prove ineffective because powerful actors fear that others will benefit disproportionately. Grieco notes that institutional rules cannot override these concerns, leaving the organisation marginal during crises that affect vital interests.
Allison (2017) provides a contemporary illustration through the concept of Thucydides’s Trap. Rising powers such as China challenge the United States, and the resulting strategic competition reduces the space for UN-centred diplomacy. Allison suggests that institutional forums may slow escalation but cannot prevent structural rivalry from reshaping order. In this reading, the UN operates at the margins of great-power relations rather than at their core.
Liberal Perspectives: Cooperation, Interdependence and Normative Influence
Liberal institutionalists contend that the United Nations remains relevant by reducing transaction costs and facilitating repeated interactions among states. Keohane and Nye (1977) describe complex interdependence in which multiple channels connect societies and military force becomes less usable. Under these conditions, the UN supplies forums for issue linkage and information exchange that states find valuable even when power differentials persist.
Keohane (1984) develops this line of argument by showing how institutions promote cooperation after hegemony. Although the United States no longer enjoys unchallenged dominance, the UN continues to embody rules and procedures that states accept because they lower the risks of defection. The organisation’s technical agencies and peacekeeping operations demonstrate this ongoing utility, suggesting that its role is not confined to great-power bargaining.
Ikenberry (2018) examines the resilience of the liberal international order and concludes that the UN, despite evident flaws, continues to anchor multilateral norms. Weiss (2018) similarly asks whether the world would be better without the UN and answers that the organisation’s capacity to authorise peacekeeping missions and coordinate humanitarian relief provides tangible public goods. Weiss (2022) further contends that the foundational principles of the UN remain adaptable, allowing incremental reforms that preserve its convening power. These arguments imply that the UN’s centrality derives less from enforcement capacity and more from its function as a focal point for collective action.
Assessing the UN’s Position in Contemporary Order
Comparing the two perspectives reveals partial truths on both sides. Realism correctly identifies that the Security Council’s veto structure grants decisive influence to a handful of states, thereby reproducing rather than transcending power politics. Evidence from recent veto patterns supports Mearsheimer’s and Grieco’s claims that institutions remain tools of the powerful. Yet this does not render the UN irrelevant; liberal scholars demonstrate that the organisation’s broader membership and specialised agencies create arenas where smaller states can advance agendas and where norms acquire some independent weight.
Schindler (2018) acknowledges persistent shortcomings in UN performance but also notes that states continue to invest diplomatic resources in its processes. This investment suggests that the organisation retains a measure of centrality even if it cannot dictate outcomes to great powers. The coexistence of realist constraints and liberal functions means the UN sits at the intersection of power and cooperation; it is neither the dominant authority nor a negligible sideshow.
Therefore, the United Nations remains an important but not exclusive centre of contemporary international order. Its influence is conditional on alignment with great-power preferences and on the willingness of states to utilise its facilities for problem-solving. When these conditions hold, the organisation shapes agendas; when they do not, order reverts to bilateral or plurilateral arrangements outside UN auspices.
Conclusion
This essay has clarified that realism portrays the United Nations as constrained by anarchy and great-power competition, whereas liberalism emphasises its continuing value in fostering cooperation under interdependence. Assessment of both viewpoints indicates that the UN occupies a significant yet secondary position. It provides institutional infrastructure that states selectively employ, but it does not constitute the sole or decisive locus of contemporary order. Future relevance will depend on whether member states, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, choose to strengthen or circumvent its mechanisms.
References
- Allison, G. (2017) Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Grieco, J. M. (1988) Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization, 42(3), pp. 485–507.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2018) The end of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), pp. 7–23.
- Keohane, R. O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Schindler, S. (2018) What is wrong with the United Nations? Global Governance, 24(4), pp. 507–524.
- Weiss, T. G. (2018) Would the World Be Better Without the UN? Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Weiss, T. G. (2022) Rethinking Global Governance and the UN’s Founding. International Studies Quarterly, 66(1), pp. 1–12.
