Analysing the Modern Challenge to the Post-World War II Global Order: The Rise of China and the South China Sea Dispute through Power Transition Theory

Introduction

The post-World War II global order, characterised by institutions like the United Nations and norms of international law, has faced increasing challenges from rising powers. One prominent example is the rapid ascent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has disrupted the US-led hegemonic structure. This essay examines this challenge through the lens of Power Transition Theory (PTT), focusing on the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. PTT posits that conflicts arise when a rising power approaches parity with the dominant hegemon, potentially leading to war during power transitions (Organski and Kugler, 1980). The essay will first introduce and discuss PTT, then outline the SCS dispute, before critically applying the theory to the case. It will highlight why the SCS represents an interesting application of PTT, while also addressing the theory’s shortcomings, such as its limited consideration of non-military factors. By doing so, this analysis underscores the tensions in contemporary international relations, where economic interdependence and regional dynamics complicate traditional power shift predictions. The discussion draws on key academic sources to evaluate these elements, revealing both the explanatory power and limitations of PTT in explaining Sino-US rivalry.

Power Transition Theory

Power Transition Theory, originally developed by A.F.K. Organski in the 1950s, provides a framework for understanding shifts in the international hierarchy and the potential for conflict during these changes. Unlike balance-of-power theories, which emphasise equilibrium among states, PTT focuses on the hierarchical structure of the international system, where a dominant power maintains order until challenged by a dissatisfied rising state (Organski, 1958). At its core, the theory argues that wars are most likely when a challenger achieves approximate power parity with the hegemon, particularly if the challenger is dissatisfied with the status quo. Satisfaction is determined by the rising power’s acceptance of the existing rules and benefits distribution; dissatisfied challengers seek to revise the system, increasing the risk of conflict (Lemke and Reed, 1996).

Organski and Kugler (1980) refined the theory by introducing empirical measures of power, such as gross national product (GNP), population, and political capacity, to quantify transitions. They identified historical examples, like the rise of Germany challenging Britain before World War I, where power parity coincided with dissatisfaction, leading to war. Conversely, peaceful transitions occur when the challenger is satisfied, as seen in the US overtaking Britain in the early 20th century. PTT also distinguishes between global and regional hierarchies, suggesting that transitions can occur at subsystem levels, which is particularly relevant for regional disputes like the SCS (Lemke, 2002).

Critics of PTT, however, note its deterministic tendencies, arguing that it overemphasises material power while undervaluing ideational factors, alliances, or domestic politics (Vasquez, 1996). Nevertheless, the theory remains influential in international relations for explaining hegemonic stability and the risks of power shifts. In the context of modern challenges to the post-WWII order—established under US leadership with institutions like the Bretton Woods system—PTT offers insights into how China’s rise threatens this framework. China’s dissatisfaction stems from perceived inequities in global governance, such as its limited influence in the International Monetary Fund despite its economic might (Johnston, 2003). Thus, PTT frames the PRC’s ascent as a potential precursor to conflict, especially in flashpoints where interests collide.

The South China Sea Dispute

The South China Sea dispute exemplifies the tensions arising from China’s rise, involving overlapping territorial claims and strategic interests among multiple states. Covering approximately 3.5 million square kilometres, the SCS is a vital maritime route for global trade, with over 30% of the world’s shipping passing through it, and it holds significant oil and gas reserves estimated at 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (US Energy Information Administration, 2013). The primary claimants include China, which asserts sovereignty over nearly 90% of the sea via its “nine-dash line”—a demarcation originating from historical maps but lacking clear legal basis under international law—alongside Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan (Hayton, 2014).

The dispute intensified in the post-Cold War era, particularly with China’s militarisation efforts since the 2010s. Beijing has constructed artificial islands, installed military facilities, and conducted patrols, actions that challenge the freedom of navigation upheld by the US and its allies. A landmark event was the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which invalidated China’s nine-dash line claims and affirmed the Philippines’ rights in its exclusive economic zone (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2016). However, China rejected the ruling, labelling it “null and void,” and continued its activities, including harassing fishing vessels and energy exploration by other claimants (Kaplan, 2014).

The US involvement adds a great-power dimension, with Washington conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to contest China’s claims and support allies like the Philippines through defence pacts. This has led to incidents, such as the 2018 near-collision between US and Chinese warships, heightening escalation risks (Panda, 2018). Regionally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sought a Code of Conduct, but progress is slow due to divisions among members and China’s influence (Storey, 2013). The dispute thus challenges the post-WWII order by undermining norms like UNCLOS and testing US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, where China’s actions reflect its broader ambition to reshape regional security architecture.

Applying Power Transition Theory to the South China Sea Dispute

Applying Power Transition Theory to the South China Sea dispute offers a compelling lens for analysing China’s challenge to the US-led global order. PTT posits that as a rising power like China approaches parity with the dominant hegemon (the US), dissatisfaction with the status quo increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly in peripheral regions where interests overlap (Organski and Kugler, 1980). China’s GDP, now the world’s second-largest and projected to surpass the US by the 2030s (World Bank, 2022), exemplifies this nearing parity. In the SCS, China’s assertive actions—such as island-building and militarisation—can be seen as revisionist behaviour aimed at altering the regional hierarchy, where the US has long maintained naval dominance through alliances and basing rights (Mearsheimer, 2014).

This case is particularly interesting as an application of PTT because it illustrates a regional power transition within the broader global context. Lemke (2002) extends PTT to regional subsystems, arguing that local hierarchies can experience transitions independently of the global one. The SCS represents such a subsystem, where China seeks to establish dominance, challenging US influence without immediate global war. For instance, China’s dissatisfaction is evident in its rejection of the 2016 arbitral ruling, which aligns with PTT’s emphasis on challengers’ refusal to accept hegemon-imposed rules (Allison, 2017). Moreover, the potential for escalation fits PTT’s prediction of war during parity; while no full-scale conflict has erupted, incidents like the 2021 harassment of Philippine vessels highlight “brinkmanship” that could precipitate wider confrontation (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2021).

Evidence supports this application: China’s military spending has grown from $50 billion in 2000 to over $250 billion in 2022, closing the gap with the US (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2023). This material shift, coupled with Beijing’s narrative of “national rejuvenation,” underscores dissatisfaction with the post-WWII order, which China views as Western-centric (Johnston, 2003). Critically, however, PTT’s application here reveals nuances; the theory predicts higher conflict risks when the challenger is dissatisfied, yet economic interdependence—China being the US’s largest trading partner—may deter outright war, adding a layer of complexity (Gholz and Press, 2001). Nonetheless, the SCS case vividly demonstrates PTT’s relevance in explaining how rising powers exploit regional disputes to test hegemonic resolve, making it a textbook example for studying modern great-power rivalry.

Shortcomings of Power Transition Theory in this Instance

Despite its strengths, Power Transition Theory exhibits notable shortcomings when applied to the South China Sea dispute, failing to fully explain key dynamics and outcomes. Primarily, PTT’s focus on material power parity and dissatisfaction overlooks the role of multilateral institutions and alliances in mitigating conflict. For example, while PTT anticipates war during transitions, the SCS has seen no major armed conflict, arguably due to ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts and US alliances, which diffuse tensions through dialogue rather than direct confrontation (Buszynski, 2012). This highlights PTT’s limitation in accounting for institutional constraints; Organski and Kugler (1980) emphasise bilateral power dynamics, but in reality, networks like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (involving the US, Japan, India, and Australia) complicate simple hegemon-challenger dichotomies.

Furthermore, PTT underexplains non-military dimensions, such as economic coercion and “grey zone” tactics, which China employs in the SCS. Beijing’s use of fishing militias and economic sanctions against claimants like Vietnam represents hybrid warfare, not captured by PTT’s war-centric predictions (Erickson and Liff, 2016). The theory also fails to address domestic factors; China’s actions are influenced by nationalist pressures and the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy needs, which PTT treats as secondary to systemic variables (Shirk, 2007). Critically, PTT assumes dissatisfaction leads inexorably to revisionism, yet China’s selective compliance with global norms—such as in trade—suggests a more nuanced strategy, blending integration and challenge (Johnston, 2003). Thus, while PTT identifies the risk of transition, it falls short in explaining why conflict remains contained, underscoring the need for complementary theories like liberal institutionalism to provide a fuller picture.

Conclusion

In summary, Power Transition Theory effectively illuminates the challenges posed by China’s rise to the post-WWII global order, particularly in the South China Sea, where nearing power parity and dissatisfaction heighten tensions. The SCS dispute serves as an intriguing case study, demonstrating regional applications of PTT and the risks of hegemonic rivalry. However, the theory’s shortcomings—such as its neglect of institutions, non-military tactics, and domestic politics—reveal its limitations in fully explaining the absence of war and the complexity of Sino-US interactions. These insights have broader implications for international relations, suggesting that while power shifts create instability, interdependence and diplomacy can avert catastrophe. Policymakers should therefore prioritise multilateral engagement to manage transitions peacefully, ensuring the durability of the global order amid rising powers like China.

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