Introduction
The Holocaust and associated atrocities during World War II raise profound questions about human behaviour, particularly how ordinary individuals could participate in or tolerate the persecution and murder of their neighbours. Milton Mayer’s They Thought They Were Free (1955) explores this through interviews with ten ‘ordinary’ Germans in the post-war period, revealing how they acquiesced to the Nazi regime. Similarly, Jan T. Gross’s Neighbors (2001) examines the 1941 pogrom in Jedwabne, Poland, where local Poles massacred their Jewish neighbours without direct German coercion. This essay draws on these works, alongside the ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth from post-World War I Germany and Robert Gellately’s analysis in Backing Hitler (2001) of how persecution became normalised in Nazi society. It addresses the combination of ideological, economic, social, and psychological factors that enabled such complicity. Furthermore, it compares Mayer and Gross’s explanations, identifying areas of agreement and divergence. By analysing these elements, the essay highlights the complex interplay of influences that allowed everyday people to support or ignore genocidal actions, offering insights into the fragility of moral boundaries in times of crisis.
Ideological Factors
Ideological influences played a central role in fostering an environment where ordinary people could rationalize or participate in persecution. In Germany, the ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth, which falsely claimed that Jews and socialists had betrayed the nation during World War I, created a fertile ground for anti-Semitic propaganda (Fritz, 1987). This narrative, propagated by right-wing groups and later the Nazis, framed Jews as internal enemies, making their exclusion seem like a patriotic duty. Mayer (1955) illustrates this through his interviewees, who viewed Nazi ideology as a restoration of national pride after the humiliations of Versailles. For instance, one man described the regime’s early years as bringing ‘order’ and unity, ideologically blinding him to emerging atrocities.
In Poland, Gross (2001) describes a similar ideological undercurrent, albeit shaped by local nationalism and historical resentments. The Jedwabne massacre was influenced by pre-war anti-Semitism, amplified by Soviet occupation and the myth that Jews collaborated with communists. This ideological framing portrayed Jews as threats to Polish identity, justifying violence as a form of national self-defence. Gellately (2001) complements this by arguing that in Nazi Germany, persecution became normalised through ideological indoctrination via media and education, where denouncing ‘enemies’ was seen as civic responsibility. However, while ideology provided a justifying framework, it often required economic incentives to gain widespread traction, as people prioritised personal stability over abstract beliefs.
Economic Factors
Economic pressures significantly contributed to ordinary people’s tolerance or involvement in persecution, often overriding moral reservations. In post-World War I Germany, hyperinflation and the Great Depression created widespread hardship, making the Nazi promise of economic recovery appealing. Mayer (1955) notes that his subjects, many from middle-class backgrounds, supported the regime because it delivered jobs and stability; one interviewee, a teacher, appreciated the end of unemployment, even as he ignored anti-Jewish laws. This economic pragmatism allowed individuals to compartmentalise ethical concerns, focusing instead on personal gains like Aryanisation policies that transferred Jewish property to non-Jews (Bajohr, 2002).
Gross (2001) identifies parallel economic motives in Jedwabne, where Poles seized Jewish homes and businesses during the pogrom, driven by opportunism amid wartime chaos. The economic disenfranchisement of Jews under occupation made their elimination a means to redistribute resources, with locals participating to secure material benefits. Gellately (2001) extends this by showing how economic normalisation of persecution occurred through incentives like promotions for reporting Jews, embedding anti-Semitism into everyday economic life. Arguably, these factors were not isolated but intersected with social dynamics, as economic desperation fostered group conformity and scapegoating.
Social Factors
Social structures and pressures were crucial in enabling participation or acquiescence, as individuals often conformed to group norms to avoid isolation. Mayer (1955) describes how Nazi control over social institutions, such as schools and community groups, created a culture of conformity. His interviewees, described as ‘decent’ men, rationalised their inaction by noting that ‘everyone’ was involved, and dissent meant social ostracism or worse. This normalisation, as Gellately (2001) explains, turned persecution into a social routine; informing on neighbours became a way to demonstrate loyalty, reinforced by propaganda that portrayed Jews as outsiders.
In Jedwabne, Gross (2001) highlights the role of social cohesion in a small town, where longstanding relationships turned deadly under external pressures. The massacre involved community leaders and ordinary residents, driven by a collective frenzy that made individual resistance rare. Social factors here diverged slightly from the German context, as Polish actions were more spontaneous and less state-directed, yet both cases show how social bonds could facilitate violence when redirected against a scapegoated group. The ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth further amplified social divisions in Germany by fostering a ‘us versus them’ mentality, making exclusion socially acceptable (Evans, 2003). Indeed, these social mechanisms often masked deeper psychological processes that sustained complicity.
Psychological Factors
Psychological elements, including fear, denial, and cognitive dissonance, allowed ordinary people to tolerate or engage in atrocities without fully confronting their actions. Mayer (1955) portrays his subjects as engaging in self-deception, gradually accepting incremental restrictions on Jews as ‘necessary’ evils. One man admitted post-war that he ‘didn’t know’ about the camps, a form of willful ignorance enabled by psychological compartmentalisation. This aligns with psychological theories of obedience, where authority figures reduce personal responsibility (Milgram, 1974).
Gross (2001) similarly points to psychological denial in Jedwabne, where perpetrators later claimed coercion or minimised their roles, reflecting a need to preserve self-image. However, psychological factors in Poland were compounded by immediate trauma from occupations, leading to displaced aggression. Gellately (2001) argues that in Nazi Germany, psychological normalisation occurred through habituation to violence, where repeated exposure desensitised the populace. While both Mayer and Gross emphasise denial, the ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth added a psychological layer in Germany by providing a narrative of victimhood that justified aggression. Therefore, these factors intertwined with others, creating a multifaceted web of complicity.
Agreements and Divergences between Mayer and Gross
Mayer and Gross agree on several key points, particularly the role of ordinary people in atrocities and the gradual normalisation of persecution. Both emphasise that perpetrators were not inherently evil but ‘decent’ individuals influenced by circumstances; Mayer’s Germans and Gross’s Poles rationalised their actions through nationalism and self-interest. They concur that ideological and social factors created an environment where murder seemed tolerable, with economic gains providing practical motivation. Furthermore, both highlight psychological denial as a coping mechanism, aligning with Gellately’s (2001) normalisation thesis.
However, their explanations diverge in emphasis and context. Mayer focuses on a structured, state-driven process in Nazi Germany, where incremental policies and propaganda slowly eroded moral barriers over years. In contrast, Gross describes a more sudden, grassroots explosion of violence in Jedwabne, driven by local resentments without strong state orchestration. While Mayer integrates the ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth as a foundational ideological factor, Gross points to immediate wartime chaos and anti-communist sentiments as triggers. These differences reflect the varying scales—national regime versus local pogrom—but both underscore the danger of unchecked prejudices.
Conclusion
In summary, a combination of ideological indoctrination, economic opportunism, social conformity, and psychological denial enabled ordinary people to participate in or tolerate the persecution of their neighbours, as seen in Mayer’s and Gross’s accounts. These factors, reinforced by myths like the ‘stab-in-the-back’ and normalisation processes described by Gellately, created a permissive environment for atrocities. Mayer and Gross agree on the banality of complicity but diverge in the pace and structure of events. This analysis has implications for understanding modern extremism, reminding us that moral failings often stem from systemic influences rather than individual monstrosity. By studying these histories, we can better guard against similar failures in contemporary societies.
References
- Bajohr, F. (2002) ‘Aryanisation’ in Hamburg: The Economic Exclusion of Jews and the Confiscation of Their Property in Nazi Germany. Berghahn Books.
- Evans, R. J. (2003) The Coming of the Third Reich. Penguin Books.
- Fritz, S. G. (1987) ‘The NSDAP as Volkspartei? The Stab-in-the-Back Myth and the Nazi Party’s Appeal to the German Middle Class’, Journal of Contemporary History, 22(4), pp. 615-641.
- Gellately, R. (2001) Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany. Oxford University Press.
- Gross, J. T. (2001) Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland. Princeton University Press.
- Mayer, M. (1955) They Thought They Were Free: The Germans, 1933-45. University of Chicago Press.
- Milgram, S. (1974) Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. Harper & Row.
