Introduction
In the field of practical ethics, debates surrounding abortion remain highly contentious, often pitting individual rights against moral considerations of life and potential. Don Marquis’s 1989 paper, “Why Abortion is Immoral,” published in The Journal of Philosophy, presents a secular argument against abortion that avoids traditional appeals to religious doctrine or the moral status of the fetus. Instead, Marquis focuses on the value of a future life, arguing that abortion is prima facie wrong because it deprives the fetus of a “future like ours” (FLO). This essay, written from the perspective of an undergraduate student studying practical ethics, aims to explain the central argument of Marquis’s paper, incorporating at least three referenced quotes to illustrate key features. Following this, I will offer an original criticism of his position, and then consider how Marquis might respond to that criticism. By examining these elements, the essay will highlight the strengths and limitations of Marquis’s approach in ethical discourse on abortion, drawing on broader philosophical insights to evaluate its applicability. The discussion will demonstrate a sound understanding of ethical theories while critically engaging with the material, aligning with undergraduate-level analysis in practical ethics.
The Central Argument of Marquis’s Paper
Marquis’s central argument in “Why Abortion is Immoral” (1989) revolves around the idea that the wrongness of killing stems primarily from the deprivation of a valuable future, rather than from debates about personhood or rights. He argues that abortion is immoral because it inflicts this same deprivation on a fetus, which possesses a future akin to that of an adult human. This approach is distinctive in practical ethics as it sidesteps polarizing questions about when life begins or whether a fetus qualifies as a person, focusing instead on the harm caused by ending a potential future. Marquis builds his case by first establishing why killing adult humans is wrong, then extending this reasoning to fetuses, and finally addressing counterarguments such as contraception or animal rights.
A key feature of Marquis’s argument is his explanation of what makes killing wrong, emphasizing the victim’s loss rather than external factors. He states: “What primarily makes killing wrong is neither its effect on the murderer nor its effect on the victim’s friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim” (Marquis, 1989, p. 189). This quote illustrates the victim-centered nature of his theory, highlighting how killing deprives the individual of all future experiences. In the context of the argument, it shifts the focus from societal impacts or the killer’s intent to the intrinsic harm to the victim, providing a foundation for applying the same logic to fetuses. By prioritizing this deprivation, Marquis creates a secular, consequentialist framework that appeals to a broad audience, avoiding religious or metaphysical claims about souls or sanctity of life. This is particularly relevant in practical ethics, where arguments must often bridge diverse viewpoints.
Building on this, Marquis elaborates on the specific value lost through killing, which he terms the “future like ours” (FLO). He explains: “The loss of one’s life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one’s future” (Marquis, 1989, p. 189). This quote underscores the FLO account as the core of his anti-abortion stance, illustrating how the argument hinges on the richness and potential of future experiences. It demonstrates a key feature: the universality of the harm, applicable to any being that can be said to have a valuable future. For instance, Marquis argues that this explains why we view the killing of children or the terminally ill as wrong, even if their futures are shorter or less certain. In applying this to abortion, he posits that a fetus, from the point of conception, has a biological trajectory toward a human future filled with such experiences, making its termination morally equivalent to killing an adult. This extension is logical within his framework, as it treats the fetus not as a person per se, but as an entity with a stake in its potential life, thereby challenging pro-choice positions that emphasize women’s autonomy.
Finally, Marquis directly applies the FLO theory to abortion, asserting its immorality while allowing for exceptions in extreme cases. He writes: “Since the loss of the future to a standard fetus, if killed, is, however, at least as great a loss as the loss of the future to a standard adult human being who is killed, abortion, like ordinary killing, could be justified only by the most compelling reasons” (Marquis, 1989, p. 192). This quote captures the comparative aspect of his argument, illustrating how it equates fetal and adult futures to establish abortion’s presumptive wrongness. It highlights a critical feature: the high threshold for justification, such as in cases of rape or threats to the mother’s life, which Marquis concedes might override the FLO loss. This nuance shows his argument’s flexibility, distinguishing it from absolutist anti-abortion views. In practical ethics, this allows for evaluation against real-world scenarios, such as balancing fetal potential against maternal health risks, as discussed in broader literature (e.g., Warren, 1973). Overall, these quotes reveal Marquis’s argument as a robust, non-religious critique that prioritizes future value, making it influential in ethical debates despite ongoing controversies.
Through this structure, Marquis addresses potential objections, such as the overbreadth of FLO implying contraception is wrong (which he refutes by noting gametes lack individual futures) or its implications for animal killing (where he suggests human futures are typically more valuable). His approach demonstrates sound philosophical reasoning, drawing on consequentialist principles while critiquing both conservative and liberal extremes in the abortion debate.
An Original Criticism of Marquis’s Argument
While Marquis’s FLO theory offers a compelling secular perspective on abortion’s immorality, it faces limitations when scrutinized for its assumptions about the value of potential futures. My original criticism centers on the argument’s failure to adequately account for the quality of the future life in question, particularly in cases where the fetus might face severe suffering or diminished life prospects. Marquis assumes that any “future like ours” is inherently valuable, but this overlooks scenarios where the future could be one of profound hardship, such as congenital disabilities leading to chronic pain or socio-economic conditions resulting in extreme poverty. In practical ethics, this raises questions about whether depriving a fetus of a potentially miserable existence could be morally justifiable, or even preferable, challenging the universal application of FLO.
For example, consider a fetus diagnosed with a condition like Tay-Sachs disease, which causes progressive neurological deterioration and death in early childhood, often accompanied by intense suffering (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2017). Under Marquis’s view, aborting such a fetus would still be immoral because it deprives it of whatever future experiences remain, however brief or painful. However, this seems counterintuitive; arguably, preventing a life of inevitable agony aligns with ethical principles of harm minimization, as seen in utilitarian frameworks (Singer, 1993). Marquis’s emphasis on the quantity of future experiences—enjoyments, projects, etc.—does not sufficiently weigh qualitative factors like suffering. He briefly addresses euthanasia, suggesting FLO explains its wrongness, but this does not fully engage with cases where quality of life is so low that existence itself might be a net harm.
Furthermore, this criticism extends to broader societal contexts. In situations of extreme poverty or conflict, where a child’s future might involve starvation or violence, the FLO account could inadvertently prioritize mere survival over well-being. Empirical evidence from global health reports indicates that in low-income regions, child mortality and suffering rates are high, complicating the notion of a valuable future (World Health Organization, 2020). Marquis’s argument, by treating all human futures as comparably valuable, risks oversimplifying these realities, potentially leading to ethically problematic outcomes in policy, such as restricting abortions in cases of fetal anomalies without considering parental or societal burdens.
This flaw highlights a limitation in Marquis’s critical approach: while he evaluates a range of views, his theory shows limited awareness of how socio-economic or medical variables might undermine the presumed value of FLO. In practical ethics, where problem-solving involves addressing complex, real-world dilemmas, this omission weakens the argument’s applicability. A more nuanced version might incorporate thresholds for future quality, but as it stands, the FLO theory appears overly absolutist in valuing potential over lived experience.
How Marquis Might Respond to This Criticism
Marquis could respond to my criticism by reinforcing the foundational principles of his FLO theory, arguing that judgments about future quality are inherently subjective and unreliable, thus not sufficient grounds for justifying abortion. He might contend that predicting a “miserable” future is fraught with uncertainty, as human resilience and medical advancements can transform seemingly dire prospects. For instance, Marquis (1989) already anticipates related objections by emphasizing that the wrongness of killing holds even for those with shortened or impaired lives, such as cancer patients, whom we do not typically deem killable. Extending this, he could argue that aborting a fetus based on potential suffering parallels euthanizing an infant with a disability, which society generally views as immoral.
Moreover, Marquis might invoke the slippery slope concern: allowing abortions on quality-of-life grounds could extend to infanticide or eugenics, eroding protections for vulnerable lives (Marquis, 2007, in later works expanding his views). He could draw on ethical literature to support this, noting that personhood-based arguments (e.g., Tooley, 1972) face similar issues but that FLO provides a more consistent bulwark. In response to examples like Tay-Sachs, Marquis might concede rare exceptions under his “most compelling reasons” clause but insist that such cases do not undermine the general presumption against abortion, as the fetus still loses whatever positive experiences its future holds, however limited.
This response would demonstrate Marquis’s ability to defend his argument logically, evaluating alternative perspectives while maintaining the victim-centered focus. However, it might not fully resolve the criticism, as it relies on optimism about futures rather than empirical assessments of suffering, leaving room for ongoing debate in practical ethics.
Conclusion
In summary, Don Marquis’s “Why Abortion is Immoral” (1989) presents a persuasive central argument that abortion is wrong because it deprives the fetus of a valuable future like ours, illustrated through key quotes emphasizing victim harm, experiential loss, and justificatory thresholds. This FLO theory offers a secular alternative in practical ethics, broadening the debate beyond personhood. However, my criticism highlights its neglect of future quality in cases of severe suffering, potentially limiting its ethical robustness. Marquis might counter by stressing predictive uncertainties and consistency with anti-killing norms, yet this does not entirely mitigate the concerns. Ultimately, these discussions underscore the complexities of abortion ethics, implying a need for integrated approaches that balance potential, autonomy, and well-being in policy and philosophy. As a student in this field, engaging with such arguments reveals the ongoing relevance of critical evaluation in addressing moral dilemmas.
(Word count: 1624, including references)
References
- Marquis, D. (1989) Why abortion is immoral. The Journal of Philosophy, 86(4), pp. 183-202.
- Marquis, D. (2007) Abortion revisited. In: The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford University Press, pp. 395-415.
- Nuffield Council on Bioethics. (2017) Non-invasive prenatal testing: ethical issues. Nuffield Council on Bioethics.
- Singer, P. (1993) Practical ethics. 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press.
- Tooley, M. (1972) Abortion and infanticide. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2(1), pp. 37-65.
- Warren, M. A. (1973) On the moral and legal status of abortion. The Monist, 57(1), pp. 43-61.
- World Health Organization. (2020) World health statistics 2020: monitoring health for the SDGs. World Health Organization.
