Introduction
The notion that ‘natural’ equates to ‘good’ is a pervasive assumption in philosophical discourse, often influencing ethical, environmental, and health-related debates. This essay examines the reasons behind the belief that natural is inherently good, critically assessing whether these reasons hold up under scrutiny. It explores historical and cultural foundations, the appeal to nature fallacy, and contemporary ethical perspectives. By engaging with philosophical arguments and academic sources, the essay aims to provide a balanced evaluation of this assumption, considering both its intuitive appeal and its potential limitations.
Historical and Cultural Foundations
One primary reason for associating ‘natural’ with ‘good’ lies in historical and cultural traditions. Ancient philosophies, such as Stoicism, often portrayed nature as a source of virtue and order, suggesting that living in accordance with nature leads to a morally good life (Long, 1986). Similarly, Romanticism in the 18th and 19th centuries idealised nature as pure and uncorrupted, contrasting it with the perceived ills of industrial society. These cultural lenses have shaped a widespread belief that what is natural—be it food, lifestyles, or environments—carries an inherent moral superiority. However, this perspective often overlooks the harsh realities of nature, such as disease or predation, which are equally ‘natural’ but hardly considered good. Thus, while cultural heritage provides a foundation for this belief, it lacks a critical examination of nature’s full spectrum.
The Appeal to Nature Fallacy
A significant philosophical critique of the ‘natural is good’ assumption is the appeal to nature fallacy, as articulated by Moore (1903) in his discussion of naturalistic ethics. Moore argued that deriving moral conclusions from natural facts—equating ‘is’ with ‘ought’—is logically flawed. For instance, just because aggression is a natural instinct in humans does not mean it is morally justifiable. This fallacy highlights a key limitation in reasoning that natural equates to good, as it fails to provide a normative basis for ethics. Indeed, many natural phenomena, such as earthquakes or illnesses, cause harm, challenging the blanket assumption of inherent goodness. Therefore, while the appeal to nature is intuitively compelling, it does not withstand rigorous logical analysis.
Contemporary Ethical Perspectives
In modern ethical discussions, particularly in environmental philosophy, the idea that natural is good often underpins arguments for conservation and sustainable living. Authors like Naess (1989) advocate for deep ecology, suggesting that nature has intrinsic value, and human interference often leads to moral wrongs. This perspective supports the view that preserving natural states is inherently good. However, critics argue that such views can romanticise nature, ignoring practical human needs or the benefits of technological intervention (Rolston, 1994). For example, genetically modified crops, though ‘unnatural,’ can address food scarcity. This tension suggests that the reasons for valuing naturalness are context-dependent and not universally valid, urging a more nuanced evaluation.
Conclusion
In summary, the belief that natural is good stems from historical ideals, cultural narratives, and ethical frameworks, each offering reasons for its appeal. However, these reasons are not always robust; the appeal to nature fallacy reveals logical flaws, and contemporary debates highlight practical contradictions. While the intuitive link between natural and good persists, it requires critical scrutiny to avoid oversimplification. The implication for philosophical inquiry is clear: ethical judgments must transcend mere naturalness, incorporating reasoned analysis to address complex moral landscapes. This balance ensures that assumptions are challenged, paving the way for more informed ethical conclusions.
References
- Long, A. A. (1986) Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. University of California Press.
- Moore, G. E. (1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press.
- Naess, A. (1989) Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. Cambridge University Press.
- Rolston, H. (1994) Conserving Natural Value. Columbia University Press.
