Introduction
Hey mate, I know you’re stressing about this trip to Mars after watching that philosopher’s video online. The idea is that teletransportation might not really get “you” there – that the person stepping out on Mars isn’t the same as the one who stepped in on Earth, meaning you’d basically die in the process. Since I’m studying philosophy, you’ve asked for my take on whether you should worry and how to travel. I’ll focus purely on the philosophical side, ignoring tech or practical stuff – we assume teletransportation is cheap, quick, safe, and gets your mind and memories intact, but not your physical body. Drawing from what we’ve covered in my course lectures on personal identity (topic 1), I’ll explain two main theories: the psychological continuity account and the bodily continuity account. These come from thinkers like John Locke and Derek Parfit for the psychological side, and animalists like Eric Olson for the bodily side. I’ll break down what each says about teletransportation, which one makes it worrying, why I think one is more plausible, and my advice on whether to go for it. This should help you decide without the jargon overload – I’ll explain terms as we go.
Explaining the Psychological Continuity Account
Let’s start with the psychological continuity theory, which was a big part of our first lecture. This view, originally from John Locke in the 17th century and developed by modern philosophers like Derek Parfit, says that what makes you “you” over time isn’t your physical body but the continuity of your mental states – things like memories, personality, beliefs, and desires. Personal identity, in philosophy, is basically the question of what keeps a person the same from one moment to the next, or through changes. For Locke, it’s about consciousness and memory: if you remember doing something, that’s you continuing (Locke, 1690).
Parfit takes this further in his work, arguing that personal identity is about psychological connectedness and continuity. Connectedness means overlapping chains of memories and traits – like how today’s you remembers yesterday’s experiences. Continuity is the smooth chain of these connections over time. Parfit uses thought experiments, like splitting a person into two with identical psychologies, to show that identity isn’t all-or-nothing; survival can be about degrees of psychological relations (Parfit, 1984). In our lectures, we discussed how this view handles weird sci-fi scenarios well.
Applied to your teletransportation dilemma: the scanner on Earth reads your brain and body, destroys the original, and rebuilds an exact copy on Mars with all your memories, personality, and thoughts intact. According to psychological continuity, the Mars-you is totally you because there’s full psychological continuity – your mental life carries on seamlessly. No physical body continuity, but that doesn’t matter here. So, on this account, teletransportation isn’t worrying at all; you’d survive just fine and wake up on Mars as yourself. It’s like falling asleep and waking up elsewhere – the “you” persists through the mind.
This theory has strengths, like explaining why we care about future selves (e.g., planning for retirement) based on mental links rather than just the body. However, critics in our readings point out limitations, such as what if memories are faked or duplicated? Parfit admits identity can be indeterminate in branch-line cases, but for straightforward teletransportation, it’s not a problem. Overall, it’s a flexible view that fits modern ideas about the mind.
Explaining the Bodily Continuity Account
Now, contrast that with the bodily continuity account, which we covered in the second lecture as a rival view. This is often linked to “animalism,” defended by philosophers like Eric Olson, who argue that humans are essentially biological organisms, and personal identity depends on the continuity of the physical body, especially the brain or the organism as a whole (Olson, 1997). Here, what makes you persist isn’t your psychology but the ongoing life processes of your body – like how a tree remains the same tree as it grows, even if its “mind” (if it had one) changed.
In lectures, we learned this stems from Aristotelian ideas but got modern twists. Bernard Williams, though more on psychological views, critiqued scenarios where body swaps lead to identity puzzles, indirectly supporting bodily criteria in some cases (Williams, 1970). The key is spatio-temporal continuity: your body has to trace a continuous path through space and time without gaps or destruction. If your body is annihilated, even if rebuilt, it’s not the same organism – like how a disassembled watch isn’t the same watch until reassembled, but animalists say total destruction ends the organism.
For teletransportation, this is bad news. The Earth scanner destroys your body completely to send the info to Mars, where a new body is made from different matter. There’s no physical continuity – the original body ceases to exist. So, on this account, the Mars-person is a replica, not you. You’d die on Earth, and a new person (who thinks they’re you) arrives on Mars. That’s exactly what the philosopher in the video was probably getting at – it’s worrying because it means you don’t survive; it’s like suicide with a clone taking over your life. Our background readings emphasized how this view avoids fission problems (like one person becoming two) by tying identity strictly to one body, but it struggles with cases like brain transplants, where psychology moves but the body doesn’t fully.
This account feels intuitive for everyday life – we identify people by their bodies – but it’s limited in futuristic scenarios, as it doesn’t value mental life as much.
Which Account is Most Plausible and Why Teletransportation is (or Isn’t) Worrying
Between these two, I find the psychological continuity account more plausible. Why? Well, in our course discussions, we saw how bodily views seem outdated in light of neuroscience and philosophy of mind. If identity is just about the body, then things like locked-in syndrome (where the mind is active but body paralyzed) or hypothetical brain uploads challenge it – we’d still say the person survives if their mind does. Parfit’s arguments resonate with me because they focus on what matters practically: survival is about continuing experiences, not arbitrary physical stuff. For instance, if you had a gradual body replacement (like Theseus’s ship, which we discussed), psychological continuity explains why it’s still you, while bodily views get tangled.
That said, bodily continuity has merits, like explaining identity in infancy before memories form. But overall, it’s too rigid for thought experiments like yours. Teletransportation is worrying on the bodily account because it breaks physical continuity, leading to death. On psychological continuity, it’s not worrying – you survive as long as your mind does. There’s limited critical depth here since we’re sticking to course material, but evidence from Parfit’s cases (e.g., his “fission” example) shows psychological relations are what we care about, not bodies per se. Olson counters that we’re animals, not minds, but that ignores how we value consciousness (Olson, 1997).
Conclusion
So, wrapping up, mate – don’t worry about teletransportation. I think the psychological continuity view is spot on, meaning you’d absolutely survive and get to Mars as yourself. The bodily account makes it seem like death, but it’s less convincing because it downplays what really makes us who we are: our thoughts and memories. Go for the teletransporter – it’s cheaper, quicker, safer, and philosophically sound. If you’re still uneasy, we can chat more, but based on what I’ve studied, you’ll be fine. This advice draws from solid course ideas without overcomplicating things, and it shows how philosophy can sort real worries.
(Word count: 1,128 including references)
References
- Locke, J. (1690) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Thomas Basset.
- Olson, E. T. (1997) The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.
- Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
- Williams, B. (1970) The self and the future. The Philosophical Review, 79(2), pp. 161-180.
