Introduction
Since the 1967 Six-Day War, diplomacy has gradually replaced interstate conflict as the primary mode of engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with significant initiatives such as Camp David (1978 and 2000), the Madrid Conference (1991), and the Oslo Accords attempting to forge peace. However, despite decades of negotiations, a durable Israeli-Palestinian settlement remains elusive. This essay argues that peace initiatives have repeatedly failed due to structural power asymmetries institutionalised after 1967, the deferral of core “final status” issues at Oslo, ongoing territorial transformation through settlement expansion, and crises of legitimacy among leaderships. Drawing selectively on realist and liberal institutionalist perspectives, alongside settler-colonial insights, the analysis demonstrates that diplomacy has often functioned as conflict management rather than resolution. Ultimately, peace processes have operated within constraints that render lasting agreements politically and materially untenable.
From War to Diplomacy: Structural Asymmetry Post-1967
The 1967 war marked a turning point, with Israel occupying the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and Golan Heights, placing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians under its control. UN Security Council Resolution 242 introduced the “land for peace” formula, calling for withdrawal from “territories occupied” but with deliberately ambiguous wording that avoided explicit recognition of Palestinian national rights (UNSC, 1967). From a realist perspective, this asymmetry—Israel’s military and territorial dominance against a stateless Palestinian population—structured all subsequent diplomacy. The Camp David Accords of 1978 between Israel and Egypt illustrated that interstate peace was achievable when both parties held sovereignty, yet Palestinian autonomy was vaguely deferred, leaving their political status unresolved (Quandt, 2001). Indeed, the roots of competing sovereignty claims trace back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which endorsed a Jewish national home without addressing Palestinian rights, perpetuating foundational ambiguities. Therefore, diplomacy emerged within a framework of inequality that limited incentives for meaningful territorial concessions.
Oslo’s Incrementalism and Deferred Issues
The 1991 Madrid Conference, facilitated by post-Cold War US dominance, shifted the conflict toward direct negotiations. The Oslo Accords (1993-1995) established mutual recognition and the Palestinian Authority, envisioning phased Israeli withdrawals. Grounded in liberal institutionalist logic, Oslo promoted incrementalism, assuming gradual cooperation would build trust (Pundak, 2001). However, core “final status” issues—borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and sovereignty—were deferred, with no binding enforcement mechanisms. The 1999 deadline for completion was not met, and fragmentation through Areas A, B, and C entrenched Palestinian division. Rather than ending occupation, Oslo restructured it administratively, leading critics to label it as “outsourcing” governance without autonomy. Thus, by postponing existential disputes, Oslo eroded trust and legitimacy, contributing significantly to the failure of a durable settlement.
Territorial Transformation and Settlement Expansion
While negotiations persisted, Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank accelerated, particularly in Area C post-Oslo. This created non-contiguous Palestinian enclaves, reinforced by infrastructure like checkpoints and bypass roads, making territorial contiguity for a future state increasingly unfeasible (B’Tselem, 2019). Through a settler-colonial lens, this reflects not just security policy but territorial consolidation, altering “facts on the ground.” The Camp David Summit of 2000 exposed these contradictions; proposals lacked guarantees for contiguous territory or resolution of the refugee issue, rendering Palestinian statehood non-viable in their view (Ross, 2004). Diplomacy assumed divisible land, yet ongoing expansion progressively narrowed feasible options, undermining the two-state solution and moderate leadership on both sides. This structural disjunction remains a core reason for repeated failure.
Conclusion
Peace initiatives in Israel/Palestine have consistently failed to produce a durable settlement due to systemic constraints established after 1967. Structural power asymmetry, crystallised in UNSC Resolution 242’s ambiguities, shaped unbalanced negotiations. Oslo’s deferral of final status issues institutionalised fragmentation, while settlement expansion eroded the territorial basis for compromise. Together, these factors highlight how diplomacy, from Camp David I to Oslo and Camp David II, has prioritised conflict management over resolution. Without simultaneously addressing sovereignty, territory, and equality, peace processes lack the foundation for lasting agreements. Arguably, future efforts must confront these structural barriers directly to move beyond temporary mitigation.
References
- B’Tselem. (2019) The Regime of Separation: Israel/Palestine and the Reality of Occupation. B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.
- Pundak, R. (2001) From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong? Survival, 43(3), pp. 31-45.
- Quandt, W. B. (2001) Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. Brookings Institution Press.
- Ross, D. (2004) The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (1967) Resolution 242. United Nations.
