Introduction
This essay critically examines the claim by List and Spiekermann (L&S) that the research of Maoz and Russett (M&R) on the democratic peace theory exemplifies their concept of non-reductive causal-explanatory holism in social science. The democratic peace phenomenon, which posits that democracies rarely engage in violent conflict with one another, serves as the focal point of M&R’s empirical investigation. L&S argue that such higher-level explanations, which avoid reduction to individual-level phenomena, are often necessary and appropriate for social scientific theories. By addressing a series of specific questions, this essay evaluates whether M&R’s work aligns with L&S’s methodological framework, assesses the explanatory power of M&R’s hypotheses, and considers whether reductive explanations might offer greater insight or potentially weaken the analysis. The discussion is grounded in an analysis of the provided excerpts and aims to provide a logical and evidence-based evaluation suitable for an undergraduate exploration in the philosophy of social science.
Agreement with List and Spiekermann’s Assessment of Maoz and Russett’s Research
Upon reviewing the excerpts from L&S and the detailed methodology of M&R, I am inclined to agree with L&S’s assertion that M&R’s study exemplifies the use of non-reductive causal-explanatory holism. L&S propose that certain social phenomena, such as the democratic peace, are best explained at a higher level of abstraction due to their multiple realizability at lower levels. This means that a property like “being a democracy” can manifest through various individual-level behaviours, attitudes, and structures, rendering a fully reductive explanation impractical. M&R’s research, which utilises macro-level variables such as democratic norms and institutional constraints, aligns with this perspective by focusing on structural features rather than the minutiae of individual actions. Their use of aggregate data from the Correlates of War (COW) project to establish correlations between democratic attributes and peace further supports the notion of focusing on higher-level causal relations, thus reinforcing L&S’s view on the appropriateness of holistic explanations in this context.
Relationships in Maoz and Russett’s Explanation of Democratic Peace
M&R propose three key hypotheses to explain the democratic peace phenomenon, each highlighting a distinct relationship between democratic characteristics and reduced conflict. First, they suggest that the more democratic both states in a dyad are, the less likely they are to engage in militarised disputes, independent of other factors such as wealth or alliances. This relationship contributes to the explanation by identifying democracy itself as a structural inhibitor of conflict. Secondly, M&R posit that the deeper democratic norms are embedded in a society, the lower the likelihood of disputes or escalation, arguing that longevity of democratic systems fosters norms of compromise and cooperation. Finally, their third hypothesis links higher political constraints on state executives to a reduced probability of conflict, suggesting that institutional checks limit aggressive foreign policy decisions. Each relationship is substantiated through empirical measures derived from historical data, providing a robust framework for understanding why democracies avoid war with one another. These explanations align with L&S’s advocacy for mid-level theories that capture structural patterns without delving into individual specifics.
Evaluation Against List and Spiekermann’s Three Conditions for Causal-Explanatory Holism
L&S outline three conditions for employing causal-explanatory holism: multiple levels of description, multiple realizability of higher-level properties, and microrealization robustness of causal relations. M&R’s first hypothesis, linking democratic status to peace, meets these criteria as it operates at the state level, acknowledges that “being democratic” can be instantiated variably at the individual level, and assumes that the peaceful tendency holds regardless of specific micro-level variations. Similarly, the second hypothesis on democratic norms satisfies these conditions; norms exist at a societal level, are multiply realizable through diverse cultural and political practices, and are presumed to exert influence independently of individual variations. The third hypothesis regarding executive constraints also fits, as institutional structures are a higher-level phenomenon, can manifest through different political mechanisms, and are treated as causally robust across contexts. Therefore, all three hypotheses appear to meet L&S’s conditions, supporting the legitimacy of M&R’s holistic approach in social scientific explanation.
Potential for Reductive Explanations and Their Impact
It is conceivable that M&R’s hypotheses could be elaborated at the individual level, focusing on decision-making processes, communication patterns, and norm adherence among citizens and leaders. For instance, the influence of democratic norms could be traced to how individuals internalise values of compromise through education or political participation. Likewise, executive constraints might be linked to specific actions of politicians navigating institutional rules. However, while such reductive accounts could provide additional detail, they are unlikely to enhance the explanatory power of M&R’s framework. The strength of their analysis lies in identifying broad, generalisable patterns across diverse historical cases, which a focus on individual-level data might obscure due to variability and complexity. Indeed, M&R’s approach is arguably sufficient as a scientific explanation, offering clarity and empirical rigour at a level appropriate for policy implications and theoretical development. Therefore, while reductive explanations are possible, they are not necessarily superior in this context.
Effectiveness of Reductive Explanations Compared to Higher-Level Ones
There is a distinct possibility that reductive, individual-level explanations could prove less effective than the higher-level ones provided by M&R. Social phenomena like democratic peace involve intricate interactions across numerous actors and contexts, making a comprehensive micro-level analysis not only cumbersome but also potentially misleading. For example, focusing on individual decision-making might overemphasise idiosyncratic factors—such as a leader’s personality—while neglecting structural influences like institutional checks, which M&R demonstrate as critical. Furthermore, the aggregation of individual behaviours into measurable variables, as M&R have done, allows for statistical validation through datasets like the COW project, a process that would be diluted by an overemphasis on anecdotal or fragmented data. Thus, while reductive explanations might offer granular insight in specific instances, they risk undermining the broader applicability and predictive utility that M&R’s holistic framework achieves, suggesting that higher-level explanations are generally more effective for such complex social phenomena.
Conclusion
In summary, this essay has argued that M&R’s research on democratic peace largely exemplifies L&S’s concept of non-reductive causal-explanatory holism, aligning with their methodological stance on the utility of higher-level explanations in social science. Their hypotheses concerning democratic status, norms, and executive constraints effectively meet L&S’s three conditions, demonstrating the appropriateness of a holistic approach. While reductive explanations at the individual level are feasible, they are neither necessary nor likely to improve upon M&R’s framework, which offers clarity and empirical robustness suited to the scale of the phenomenon. Indeed, such micro-level analyses might even detract from the generalisability of the findings. This evaluation underscores the importance of selecting explanatory levels that match the nature of the social issue under investigation, highlighting a key debate in the philosophy of social science regarding the balance between depth and breadth in theoretical frameworks. The implications of this discussion extend to how social scientists might approach other complex phenomena, suggesting a cautious yet justified use of holistic explanations when micro-level reduction proves impracticable.
References
- List, C. and Spiekermann, K. (2013) Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation. American Political Science Review, 107(4), pp. 629-643.
- Maoz, Z. and Russett, B. (1993) Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. American Political Science Review, 87(3), pp. 624-638.
- Singer, J. D. (1963) The Correlates of War Project: Interim Report and Rationale. World Politics, 24(2), pp. 243-270.
