Introduction
In the evolving landscape of international relations, contemporary conflict increasingly prioritises infrastructural and administrative harm over traditional kinetic and spectacular violence. This essay explores the shift in belligerent strategies towards manipulating connectivity, data access, and narrative conditions to undermine civilian capacities such as coordination, verification, and mobility. By focusing on the governance of digital life rather than interstate escalation, this transformation challenges conventional cyber-policy frameworks like attribution and deterrence. Instead, I argue that civilian protection must be the central focus of cyber operations, imposing precautionary duties and humanitarian safeguards on both states and intermediaries. This discussion aims to unpack the mechanisms of this new form of coercion, evaluate its implications, and propose a reorientation towards protecting civilian digital spaces.
The Shift to Infrastructural and Administrative Harm
Traditional warfare often involved direct, visible destruction—bombing power stations or other critical infrastructure to paralyse an enemy. However, as technology has advanced, belligerents have found subtler yet equally devastating means to achieve strategic effects. By targeting connectivity and data access, they degrade the civilian capacities necessary for survival. For instance, internet shutdowns during political unrest, as seen in numerous global contexts, prevent coordination and access to vital information (Access Now, 2021). Such actions do not require physical destruction; they exploit existing systems of governance and infrastructure to render civilian life contingent and precarious. This form of harm is often administrative, embedded in everyday practices like “lawful” intercepts or platform takedown requests, making it difficult to distinguish from routine governance. Consequently, what appears as an external “incident” is frequently a domestic practice, blurring the lines of accountability.
Limitations of Conventional Cyber-Policy Frameworks
The traditional cyber-policy repertoire, centred on attribution and deterrence, struggles to address these new dynamics. Deterrence assumes an identifiable adversary and a clear violation that can be credibly punished. However, administrative harm often involves proxy actors or intermediaries whose compliance can be coerced or plausibly denied (Singer and Brooking, 2018). For example, state-directed disinformation campaigns routed through private platforms evade direct accountability, as the actors involved operate within legal or quasi-legal frameworks. Therefore, frameworks like “cyber stability,” which focus on interstate escalation, miss the critical transformation: the relocation of coercive power into civilian digital governance. This misfocus undermines efforts to mitigate harm, as the real battlefield lies in everyday digital interactions rather than high-level state conflict.
Telecoms and Platforms as Choke Points of Coercion
Telecommunications networks and digital platforms are not mere passive contexts in modern conflict; they are active jurisdictional and technical choke points. Through these systems, access can be gated, identities made legible, and public truth rendered fragile. Governments and other actors leverage these infrastructures for surveillance and manipulation, often under the guise of national security (Deibert, 2020). For instance, when a regime enforces internet blackouts or demands user data from tech companies, it weaponises these platforms to control narratives and suppress dissent. Recognising this, it becomes clear that intermediaries bear a significant responsibility to resist coercive compliance and safeguard user rights. Their role is pivotal, yet current regulatory frameworks often fail to enforce accountability or constrain such practices effectively.
Towards a Civilian Protection Framework
Given these challenges, I propose reframing cyber operations around civilian protection rather than interstate dynamics. This approach would evaluate actions based on foreseeable civilian harm, binding states and intermediaries to precautionary duties and humanitarian safeguards. Such a framework would prioritise constraints on surveillance infrastructures and manipulative practices, ensuring compliance is governable (Milan and Treré, 2019). By centering civilian well-being, policies could better address the insidious nature of administrative harm. Indeed, protecting digital civilian life—through measures like transparency in platform governance and strict limits on data exploitation—appears not only necessary but urgent in mitigating the strategic effects of modern conflict.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this essay has highlighted the paradigm shift in contemporary conflict towards infrastructural and administrative harm, where civilian digital life becomes the primary target. Conventional cyber-policy frameworks, focused on attribution and deterrence, are ill-equipped to address this, as they overlook the embedded, everyday nature of such coercion. Telecoms and platforms, as critical choke points, must be held accountable alongside states. Ultimately, reorienting towards a civilian protection framework offers a more appropriate response, foregrounding humanitarian safeguards and precautionary duties. The implications are significant: without this shift, the erosion of civilian capacities will persist, underscoring the need for robust international norms to govern digital coercion in conflict.
References
- Access Now. (2021) Shattered Connections: Internet Shutdowns in 2021. Access Now.
- Deibert, R. J. (2020) Reset: Reclaiming the Internet for Civil Society. House of Anansi Press.
- Milan, S. and Treré, E. (2019) Big Data from the South: Beyond Data Universalism. Television & New Media, 20(4), pp. 319-335.
- Singer, P. W. and Brooking, E. T. (2018) Likewar: The Weaponization of Social Media. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
