Introduction
Natural law theory has long been a foundational concept in legal and moral philosophy, seeking to ground law in universal principles derived from human nature and reason. In the contemporary context, John Finnis, a prominent legal theorist, has revitalized this tradition through his seminal work, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (1980). Finnis reinterprets natural law by emphasizing the concept of basic human goods and practical reasonableness as central to understanding law’s moral authority. His approach departs from classical natural law theorists, such as Thomas Aquinas, by adopting a more pluralistic and analytical framework, while still retaining the core belief that law should align with human flourishing. This essay aims to critically analyze Finnis’s contributions to natural law theory. It will first explore the concept of basic human goods as the foundation of his theory, followed by an examination of practical reasonableness as a method for ethical decision-making. Finally, it will assess how Finnis diverges from classical natural law thinkers, such as Aquinas, while preserving the tradition’s essential commitment toobjective moral truths. Through this analysis, the essay seeks to evaluate the strengths and limitations of Finnis’s framework in addressing contemporary legal and moral challenges.
Basic Human Goods in Finnis’s Theory
At the heart of Finnis’s natural law theory lies the concept of basic human goods, which he identifies as fundamental aspects of human well-being that are intrinsically valuable and universally desirable. Finnis argues that these goods are self-evident and do not require further justification; they are the ends that rational beings naturally pursue (Finnis, 1980). He lists seven basic goods: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion (understood as a concern for ultimate meaning). Unlike utilitarian approaches, which prioritize outcomes or pleasure, Finnis asserts that these goods are incommensurable, meaning they cannot be ranked or reduced to a single value. For instance, the value of knowledge cannot be weighed against the value of life in a definitive hierarchy; each is valuable in its own right.
Finnis’s identification of these goods provides a foundation for moral and legal norms, as laws should, ideally, protect and promote these aspects of human flourishing. However, critics argue that Finnis’s list of goods may reflect a particular cultural or personal bias, potentially overlooking other values that different societies might prioritize (George, 1999). Despite this critique, the concept of basic goods remains a compelling framework for grounding legal principles in universal human needs, offering a counterpoint to purely positivist conceptions of law that separate legality from morality. Indeed, Finnis’s approach invites reflection on how laws—whether in criminal justice or social policy—can serve broader human purposes, a point that resonates with the natural law tradition’s emphasis on the common good.
Practical Reasonableness as a Guiding Principle
Complementing the concept of basic human goods, Finnis introduces practical reasonableness as the mechanism by which individuals and societies make moral and legal decisions. Practical reasonableness, in Finnis’s view, is both a basic good and a method for reasoning about how to act in ways that respect and pursue the other basic goods (Finnis, 1980). It involves a set of principles or requirements that guide ethical behavior, such as the need to act with coherence, avoid arbitrariness, and consider the impact of one’s actions on the community. For example, when crafting legislation, lawmakers must balance competing goods—such as protecting life through public health measures while respecting sociability through personal freedoms—using reasoned deliberation.
Practical reasonableness thus serves as a bridge between abstract moral values and concrete decision-making, emphasizing the importance of rational reflection over mere instinct or emotion. Finnis argues that this approach ensures that laws are not arbitrary but are instead oriented toward human flourishing (Finnis, 1980). However, one limitation of this concept is its reliance on the assumption that individuals and institutions can consistently exercise such rationality. Critics point out that human decision-making is often influenced by bias, emotion, or external pressures, raising questions about the feasibility of practical reasonableness in complex legal contexts (Raz, 1986). Nevertheless, Finnis’s framework provides a structured way to navigate moral dilemmas, aligning with the natural law tradition’s focus on reason as a source of moral insight.
Finnis’s Departure from and Continuity with Classical Natural Law
Finnis’s theory represents both a departure from and a continuation of classical natural law thought, particularly as articulated by Thomas Aquinas. Traditionally, Aquinas grounded natural law in a theistic framework, arguing that human reason participates in the eternal law of God, and moral principles are derived from divine order (Aquinas, 1947). Finnis, however, adopts a more secular and analytical approach, focusing on human goods that are knowable through reason alone, without explicit reference to divine will. His inclusion of religion as a basic good is framed not as theological doctrine but as a universal human concern for ultimate meaning, thus broadening the accessibility of his theory in pluralistic societies (Finnis, 1980). This shift reflects a significant departure from Aquinas’s explicitly Christian foundation, aligning Finnis’s work with contemporary philosophical discourse that prioritizes rational argumentation over metaphysical or religious assumptions.
Moreover, Finnis departs from classical natural law by rejecting the notion that moral norms are directly derived from human nature’s biological inclinations. While Aquinas linked moral duties to natural tendencies (e.g., reproduction as a basis for sexual ethics), Finnis emphasizes the normative role of reason in identifying and pursuing basic goods, thus avoiding what he sees as the “naturalistic fallacy” of deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is’ (Finnis, 1980). This analytical precision distinguishes Finnis’s methodology from the more teleological approach of classical thinkers.
Despite these differences, Finnis retains the core natural law tradition by affirming that law must have a moral basis and should promote human flourishing. Like Aquinas, he maintains that unjust laws—those that fundamentally contradict the basic goods—lack the full authority of law and may, in extreme cases, not bind in conscience (Finnis, 1980). This continuity underscores Finnis’s commitment to the principle that legal systems are not merely coercive mechanisms but must align with objective moral truths. However, his framework faces criticism for its perceived abstraction; some argue that the focus on incommensurable goods and reasoned principles struggles to provide clear guidance in resolving specific legal disputes, unlike the more prescriptive rules in classical natural law (George, 1999).
Conclusion
In conclusion, John Finnis’s contemporary natural law theory offers a nuanced reinterpretation of a longstanding philosophical tradition, grounding law in the pursuit of basic human goods and the exercise of practical reasonableness. His identification of seven fundamental goods provides a universal basis for moral and legal norms, while practical reasonableness offers a rational method for ethical decision-making. Although Finnis departs from classical natural law thinkers like Aquinas by adopting a secular, reason-based approach and rejecting biologically derived norms, he preserves the tradition’s central tenet that law must serve human flourishing and adhere to moral truths. While his framework is intellectually robust, it faces challenges in its practical application and potential cultural bias in defining human goods. Ultimately, Finnis’s theory invites critical reflection on the purpose of law in modern societies, raising important questions about how legal systems can balance competing values in pursuit of the common good. This analysis underscores the enduring relevance of natural law, even as it evolves to address contemporary complexities.
References
- Aquinas, T. (1947) *Summa Theologica*. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Benziger Bros.
- Finnis, J. (1980) *Natural Law and Natural Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- George, R. P. (1999) *In Defense of Natural Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Raz, J. (1986) *The Morality of Freedom*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
