Introduction
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), introduced in 2000 and made legally binding through the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, represents a significant milestone in the EU’s commitment to human rights. The statement under discussion suggests that the expansive case law on the Charter demonstrates the EU’s serious approach to rights protection, extending its application to EU institutions, Member States, and even horizontally between private parties. It further claims that human rights are fully protected within the EU. This essay critically examines these assertions, exploring the scope and impact of the Charter through relevant legislation and case law. While acknowledging the Charter’s significant contributions to rights protection, it argues that limitations in its application and interpretation reveal that human rights are not yet fully protected across the Union. The discussion is structured into three main sections: the Charter’s scope of application, the extent of its horizontal effect, and the broader challenges to achieving full human rights protection in the EU.
The Scope of Application: EU Institutions and Member States
The Charter of Fundamental Rights, as enshrined in Article 51(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), explicitly binds EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies in all their actions. It also applies to Member States when they are “implementing Union law” (Treaty of Lisbon, 2009). This dual application is a cornerstone of the EU’s commitment to rights, ensuring that fundamental protections—ranging from dignity and equality to justice—are upheld at both supranational and national levels. For instance, in the landmark case of Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG (C-555/07, 2010), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) affirmed that Member States must adhere to Charter principles, such as non-discrimination on grounds of age, when acting within the scope of EU law. This case demonstrated the Charter’s role in shaping national policies and practices, reinforcing the argument that the EU takes rights seriously.
However, the limitation in Article 51(1) that the Charter applies to Member States only when implementing EU law creates a significant gap. In cases where Member States act outside the scope of EU law, the Charter does not directly apply, leaving potential inconsistencies in rights protection across the Union. The CJEU clarified this in Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10, 2013), ruling that the Charter is engaged only when national measures fall within the ambit of EU law. Therefore, while the Charter’s application to both EU institutions and Member States is indeed expansive in certain contexts, it is not comprehensive, casting doubt on the claim that human rights are fully protected.
Horizontal Effect of the Charter: A Limited Reach
The statement also posits that the Charter has horizontal effect, meaning it can be invoked in disputes between private parties. This is a contentious area in EU law, as the Charter was not initially designed to have direct horizontal effect in the same way as certain Treaty provisions. Nevertheless, the CJEU has extended some Charter rights to private relationships under specific conditions. In Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT (C-176/12, 2014), the Court ruled that certain Charter provisions, such as the right to collective bargaining under Article 28, could have an indirect horizontal effect by influencing the interpretation of national law or EU directives. Such decisions suggest a progressive approach by the CJEU, indicating an intention to broaden the Charter’s protective scope.
Despite these developments, direct horizontal effect remains limited. The CJEU has consistently held that many Charter rights cannot be directly enforced against private parties unless supported by specific EU legislation. For example, in Bauer and others (C-569/16 and C-570/16, 2018), while the Court recognised the right to paid annual leave under Article 31(2) as a fundamental principle, it refrained from imposing direct obligations on private employers absent national implementation of EU directives. This nuanced stance reveals that the horizontal effect of the Charter is not as expansive as the statement suggests, and gaps in protection persist, particularly in purely private disputes. Thus, while the Charter’s influence in horizontal contexts is growing, it falls short of ensuring comprehensive human rights safeguards.
Challenges to Full Human Rights Protection in the EU
Beyond issues of scope and horizontal effect, several broader challenges undermine the assertion that human rights are fully protected in the EU. First, the Charter does not cover all rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which the EU is not yet a signatory, despite ongoing accession negotiations. This creates discrepancies between EU and Council of Europe standards, as seen in areas like freedom of expression, where ECHR jurisprudence is often more developed. Secondly, enforcement mechanisms for Charter violations remain inconsistent. While the CJEU plays a pivotal role in interpreting and enforcing Charter rights, its reliance on national courts for preliminary references—under Article 267 TFEU—can lead to uneven application across Member States, as national judicial systems vary in capacity and willingness to engage with EU law.
Moreover, political and cultural differences among Member States pose significant obstacles. Recent developments in certain Member States, such as Hungary and Poland, where rule of law concerns have arisen, highlight the fragility of rights protection even within the EU framework. For instance, the European Commission’s ongoing Article 7 TFEU proceedings against these states for breaches of fundamental values underscore that Charter rights, such as judicial independence (Article 47), are not universally upheld (European Commission, 2020). These challenges suggest that, despite the Charter’s expansive case law, systemic issues prevent the EU from achieving full human rights protection. Indeed, while the EU undeniably takes rights seriously, as evidenced by its robust judicial interpretations, the practical realisation of these rights across diverse national contexts remains incomplete.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the expansive nature of case law on the Charter of Fundamental Rights reflects a serious commitment by the EU to human rights, with its application extending to EU institutions, Member States, and, to a limited extent, horizontal contexts. Cases such as Kücükdeveci and Åkerberg Fransson demonstrate the Charter’s significant influence in shaping rights protection within the scope of EU law. However, this essay has argued that the statement’s assertion of full human rights protection is overly optimistic. Limitations in the Charter’s scope, the partial nature of its horizontal effect, and systemic challenges—including inconsistent enforcement and political divergences among Member States—reveal that gaps persist. The implications of these findings are profound, suggesting that while the EU has made substantial strides in taking rights seriously, further integration, enforcement mechanisms, and possibly accession to the ECHR are necessary to achieve comprehensive protection. Until these issues are addressed, the protection of human rights in the EU, though robust in many respects, cannot be deemed fully realised.
References
- European Commission. (2020) Rule of Law Reports: The rule of law situation in the European Union. European Commission.
- Treaty of Lisbon. (2009) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/47.
- Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG [2010] ECR I-00365.
- Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:105.
- Case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2.
- Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, Bauer and others [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:871.
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