Introduction
This essay explores the significance of America in John Locke’s concept of property as articulated in his seminal work, the *Second Treatise of Government*, particularly in Chapter V, ‘Of Property’. As a foundational text in political philosophy and law, Locke’s ideas on property have shaped modern understandings of ownership, individual rights, and the role of government. America, as both a conceptual and practical context in Locke’s writing, emerges as a critical lens through which to understand his theories. This essay will examine how Locke utilises the idea of America as an exemplar of a ‘state of nature’ to justify his labour theory of property, assess the implications of this perspective for colonial expansion, and consider the limitations and critiques of his framework in light of historical and ethical concerns. By critically engaging with Locke’s text and relevant academic sources, this discussion aims to provide a nuanced understanding of America’s role in shaping his legal and philosophical discourse on property.
Locke’s State of Nature and America as a Conceptual Tool
Central to Locke’s theory of property is the notion of the state of nature, a pre-political condition where individuals exist without formal government or societal structures. In this state, Locke argues that property arises from the mixing of one’s labour with natural resources, which are initially held in common (Locke, 1689). America, as referenced in *Of Property*, serves as a tangible representation of this theoretical construct. Locke writes, “in the beginning all the world was America,” suggesting that vast, uncultivated lands in the New World epitomise the original condition of humanity where land was abundant and unclaimed (Locke, 1689, p. 29). This depiction is significant because it allows Locke to ground his abstract theory in a seemingly real-world example, making his argument more relatable and persuasive to his European audience.
However, this conceptualisation is not without issues. While Locke presents America as a blank slate of untapped resources, this view arguably overlooks the presence of indigenous populations who had established their own systems of land use and ownership long before European arrival. As Armitage (2004) notes, Locke’s portrayal of America as an empty wilderness reflects a Eurocentric bias that facilitated the justification of colonial appropriation. Thus, America in Locke’s discourse is not merely a backdrop but a constructed idea that underpins his philosophical justification of property through labour, while simultaneously exposing the limitations of his perspective when viewed through a modern ethical lens.
The Labour Theory of Property and the American Frontier
Locke’s labour theory of property posits that individuals acquire ownership over resources by investing their labour into them, thereby transforming common goods into private property (Locke, 1689). He uses America to illustrate this principle, pointing to its vast, unused lands as a space where individuals could cultivate and claim ownership without encroaching on others due to the sheer abundance of resources. For instance, Locke states that in America, a man could “plant in some inland, vacant places” and create property without needing consent from others, given the surplus of land (Locke, 1689, p. 36). This argument is significant because it provides a practical framework for understanding how property rights emerge in a state of nature, and America becomes the testing ground for this theory.
Moreover, Locke’s focus on labour as the basis of property rights had profound implications for the economic and legal justifications of European settlement in America. His ideas arguably provided an intellectual foundation for colonial policies that prioritised cultivation and improvement of land as a marker of legitimate ownership. According to Hsueh (2002), Locke’s involvement with the Carolina colony, for which he drafted the Fundamental Constitutions, demonstrates how his philosophical ideas were intertwined with practical colonial governance. This connection suggests that America was not just a theoretical construct for Locke but also a real-world application of his principles on property, highlighting the intertwined nature of philosophy and policy in his work.
Colonial Expansion and Ethical Critiques
The significance of America in Locke’s *Of Property* extends beyond theory into the realm of colonial expansion. Locke’s assertion that uncultivated land in America could be appropriated through labour provided a moral and legal rationale for European settlers to claim territory. This perspective, while logical within Locke’s framework, raises ethical concerns about the dispossession of indigenous peoples. Tully (1993) argues that Locke’s emphasis on labour and improvement as prerequisites for property rights inherently devalued indigenous modes of land use, such as hunting and gathering, which did not align with European agricultural standards. Consequently, America in Locke’s writing becomes a site of contention, where the application of his property theory facilitated colonial domination under the guise of natural law.
Furthermore, Locke’s apparent dismissal of indigenous claims to land reflects a broader Eurocentric worldview that prioritised individual property rights over communal or customary ownership systems. This perspective is problematic, as it contributed to legal doctrines such as terra nullius—the notion of unoccupied or unused land—that justified colonial land grabs. While Locke’s framework offers a coherent explanation of property formation, its application to America reveals significant limitations, particularly in its failure to account for existing inhabitants and their rights. This critique underscores the importance of contextualising Locke’s work within the historical period of colonial expansion, where philosophical ideas often served broader imperial interests.
Limitations and Modern Relevance
While America plays a pivotal role in Locke’s articulation of property, his theory’s reliance on the New World as a state of nature oversimplifies complex social realities. Modern scholars, such as Arneil (1996), argue that Locke’s vision of America as a vacant space ignores the sophisticated political and economic systems of indigenous societies. This limitation suggests that Locke’s theory, while groundbreaking for its time, cannot be uncritically applied to contemporary legal discussions on property without addressing its historical biases.
Nevertheless, the significance of America to Locke’s Of Property remains undeniable, as it provided a conceptual and practical foundation for his ideas on individual rights and ownership. In a modern context, Locke’s labour theory continues to influence legal and philosophical debates on property law, particularly in discussions of land use and resource allocation. However, as this essay has highlighted, these ideas must be approached with an awareness of their historical implications and ethical shortcomings, especially concerning indigenous rights and colonial legacies.
Conclusion
In conclusion, America holds profound significance in John Locke’s *Of Property*, serving as both a conceptual tool and a practical example to illustrate his labour theory of property within the state of nature. By depicting America as a vast, uncultivated frontier, Locke provides a tangible basis for his philosophical arguments on ownership, while simultaneously offering a rationale for European colonial expansion. However, this portrayal reveals critical limitations, particularly in its disregard for indigenous land systems and its role in justifying dispossession. Through a critical examination of Locke’s text and scholarly interpretations, this essay has demonstrated that while America is central to Locke’s discourse on property, it also exposes the Eurocentric biases and ethical challenges inherent in his framework. The enduring relevance of Locke’s ideas in contemporary property law necessitates a careful reconsideration of their historical context and implications, ensuring that legal theory evolves to address past injustices while building on foundational principles.
References
- Armitage, D. (2004) John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government. Political Theory, 32(5), pp. 602-627.
- Arneil, B. (1996) John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hsueh, V. (2002) Giving Orders: Theory and Practice in the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina. Journal of the History of Ideas, 63(3), pp. 425-446.
- Locke, J. (1689) Two Treatises of Government. London: Awnsham Churchill.
- Tully, J. (1993) An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
