Introduction
This essay aims to advise Michael, a director of Your Health Inc and associated with Your Health Germany GmbH, on whether the conduct of Your Health Germany and No virus Ltd contravenes European Union (EU) competition law. The focus will be on the informal agreement made during a Christmas party in December 2024 to coordinate pricing strategies between the two companies, which control a significant share of the EU market for antiviral herbal medicines. This analysis will explore relevant provisions of EU law, specifically under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to assess potential breaches related to anti-competitive practices. Key points include the nature of the agreement, market dominance, and the legal implications of price coordination. The essay will conclude with practical implications for Michael and the companies involved.
EU Competition Law Framework
EU competition law, primarily governed by Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, aims to ensure fair competition within the internal market. Article 101 prohibits agreements, decisions, and concerted practices between undertakings that may affect trade between Member States and have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012). Such agreements include price-fixing, market-sharing, or other forms of collusion. Article 102, on the other hand, addresses the abuse of a dominant position within the internal market, which may apply given Your Health Germany’s 39% market share in the EU antiviral herbal medicines sector alongside No virus Ltd’s 30%.
The informal agreement at the Christmas party to inform each other about pricing changes raises immediate concerns under Article 101. Although not a formal contract, EU law recognises that even informal arrangements or concerted practices can constitute a breach if they influence market behaviour (Jones and Sufrin, 2016). The consistent pattern of similar price increases and reductions since mid-2025 suggests a coordinated approach, which arguably restricts competition by limiting independent pricing decisions.
Market Impact and Concerted Practices
To establish a breach of Article 101, it must be shown that the agreement or practice affects trade between Member States and distorts competition. Given that Your Health Germany operates across the EU through its online platform, and No virus Ltd also holds a substantial market share, their combined dominance (69% of the EU market) likely impacts interstate trade. Furthermore, parallel pricing behaviour can be evidence of a concerted practice, as established in cases such as *Commission v Anic Partecipazioni* (1999), where the European Court of Justice held that consistent conduct aligning competitors’ policies could infer collusion (Weatherill, 2014).
However, it is worth noting that such practices might be defended if they generate efficiencies or benefits for consumers under Article 101(3). In this case, there is no immediate evidence suggesting that the price coordination benefits consumers, for instance, through innovation or cost reduction. Instead, it appears to limit competition, potentially leading to higher prices for pharmacies and hospitals using the Your Health Online platform.
Potential Abuse of Dominant Position
Under Article 102, a dominant position is not unlawful per se, but abusing it is prohibited. With a combined market share of 69%, Your Health Germany and No virus Ltd may collectively hold a dominant position in the EU market. If their pricing strategy is deemed exploitative (e.g., imposing unfair prices) or exclusionary (e.g., preventing new entrants), this could constitute an abuse. However, establishing collective dominance requires evidence of tacit coordination beyond mere market share, as seen in *Compagnie Maritime Belge* (2000) (Jones and Sufrin, 2016). While the current facts suggest coordination, further investigation would be needed to confirm abuse under Article 102.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the conduct of Your Health Germany and No virus Ltd likely breaches EU competition law under Article 101 TFEU due to the informal agreement on pricing, evidenced by parallel price movements since mid-2025. This arrangement appears to restrict competition and affect trade within the EU, with little justification for consumer benefits. Additionally, their significant market share raises concerns about potential abuse of a dominant position under Article 102, though further evidence is required. Michael should be advised that such practices could attract scrutiny from the European Commission, potentially leading to fines or injunctions. To mitigate risks, he should ensure immediate cessation of any coordinated pricing discussions and seek legal counsel to review compliance with EU competition rules. The broader implication is the need for stricter internal policies to prevent anti-competitive behaviour, particularly in multinational operations.
References
- Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012) Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/47.
- Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. (2016) EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. 6th ed. Oxford University Press.
- Weatherill, S. (2014) Cases and Materials on EU Law. 11th ed. Oxford University Press.
