Introduction
This essay examines the liberal approach to freedom and tolerance, drawing specifically on pages 84-86 of Ball and Dagger (2011), and evaluates the issues this perspective creates, particularly from a criminological standpoint. Liberalism, as a political philosophy, prioritises individual rights and freedoms, often advocating for tolerance as a cornerstone of a just society. However, this approach raises complex challenges, especially in balancing personal liberties with societal order and safety. The first section outlines the liberal stance on freedom and tolerance, linking to key points in Ball and Dagger’s text. The subsequent section critically evaluates the problems arising from this approach, with a focus on its implications for crime, justice, and social cohesion. By engaging with these themes, this essay aims to provide a nuanced understanding of liberal toleration and its limitations within a criminological context.
The Liberal Approach to Freedom and Tolerance
According to Ball and Dagger (2011, pp. 84-86), liberalism fundamentally champions individual freedom as a core value, viewing it as essential for personal development and societal progress. Freedom, in this context, encompasses the right to act, speak, and think without undue interference, provided such actions do not harm others. Tolerance, as an extension of this principle, is the willingness to accept diverse beliefs and behaviours, even when they conflict with one’s own values. The authors highlight that liberals often draw on the ideas of John Stuart Mill, who argued that restricting individual freedoms should only occur to prevent harm to others—a principle known as the ‘harm principle’. This approach, therefore, promotes a society where differences are not merely endured but respected, fostering an environment of mutual coexistence.
In a criminological sense, this liberal perspective suggests that laws should prioritise personal autonomy over strict moral or social conformity. Ball and Dagger (2011, p. 85) note that liberals advocate for minimal state intervention, arguing that over-regulation stifles freedom and risks creating oppressive systems. For instance, liberal tolerance might support decriminalising certain behaviours, such as drug use, if they are deemed to primarily affect the individual rather than society at large. However, this stance raises questions about where the boundaries of tolerance lie and how harm is defined—a point that requires further scrutiny, particularly in criminal justice contexts.
Evaluating the Issues of Liberal Toleration
While the liberal approach to freedom and tolerance offers a framework for promoting individual rights, it generates significant challenges, especially when viewed through a criminological lens. One key issue, as Ball and Dagger (2011, p. 86) suggest, is the difficulty in defining and applying the ‘harm principle’. Determining what constitutes harm is often subjective; for example, tolerating hate speech under the banner of free expression might indirectly incite violence or discrimination, posing risks to public safety. In a criminal justice context, this ambiguity can lead to inconsistent legal responses, where harmful behaviours are inadequately addressed due to an overemphasis on personal liberty. Indeed, the tension between protecting individual rights and ensuring collective security remains a persistent dilemma.
Furthermore, liberal toleration can arguably undermine social cohesion, creating environments where deviant behaviours are insufficiently regulated. From a criminological perspective, excessive tolerance might embolden criminal activities if offenders perceive a lack of consequences. For instance, lenient policies on minor offences, rooted in liberal ideals of minimal intervention, could escalate into more serious crimes if not coupled with effective deterrence mechanisms (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004). Additionally, Ball and Dagger (2011, p. 86) point out that liberal tolerance often struggles to address cultural or moral conflicts, particularly in diverse societies. In such cases, the state’s reluctance to intervene may exacerbate tensions, potentially leading to social disorder or vigilantism as communities take justice into their own hands.
Another concern is the potential for liberal policies to disproportionately affect vulnerable groups. While advocating for freedoms, liberalism may overlook structural inequalities that limit access to those freedoms. In criminology, this is evident in debates over policies like drug decriminalisation, which may benefit some but leave marginalised communities exposed to exploitation or harsher systemic consequences (Stevens, 2011). Therefore, while liberal toleration aims for fairness, it often grapples with practical challenges in balancing freedom with accountability and protection.
Conclusion
In summary, the liberal approach to freedom and tolerance, as explored by Ball and Dagger (2011, pp. 84-86), prioritises individual autonomy and advocates for minimal state interference, guided by principles such as Mill’s harm principle. While this perspective fosters diversity and personal liberty, it raises critical issues, particularly within criminology. Challenges include the ambiguity of defining harm, the risk of undermining social order, and the potential neglect of vulnerable populations due to an overemphasis on individual rights. These tensions highlight the need for a balanced approach that integrates liberal values with mechanisms to ensure safety and equity. For criminologists, understanding these limitations is crucial in shaping policies that neither suppress freedoms nor compromise societal well-being. Ultimately, addressing the complexities of liberal toleration requires ongoing dialogue and adaptation to diverse social and criminal justice contexts.
References
- Ball, T. and Dagger, R. (2011) Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal. 8th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- Hillyard, P. and Tombs, S. (2004) ‘Beyond Criminology: Taking Harm Seriously’, Theoretical Criminology, 8(1), pp. 59-77.
- Stevens, A. (2011) ‘Telling Policy Stories: An Ethnographic Study of the Use of Evidence in Policy-Making about Drugs in the UK’, Journal of Social Policy, 40(2), pp. 237-255.
