Introduction
The concept of military rule as a form of government has long been a subject of debate within political and legal studies. Military rule, often established through coups or emergency powers, typically involves the armed forces assuming control over state functions, suspending civilian governance, and prioritising order and stability. This essay critically examines the assertion that military rule is the best form of government, evaluating its strengths and weaknesses from a legal and political perspective. It argues that, while military rule may offer short-term benefits such as stability in times of crisis, it generally fails to provide the accountability, legitimacy, and protection of rights essential for sustainable governance. The discussion will explore the context of military regimes, their impact on legal frameworks, and the broader implications for democratic principles, drawing on academic literature and historical examples.
The Case for Military Rule: Stability and Order
Proponents of military rule often argue that it can provide immediate stability in contexts of political turmoil or state failure. In situations where civilian governments are unable to maintain order—due to corruption, internal conflict, or economic collapse—military intervention can establish a semblance of control. For instance, in post-colonial states, military regimes have historically stepped in to restore order amidst weak democratic institutions. Nordlinger (1977) suggests that military governments can act decisively, unencumbered by bureaucratic delays or partisan gridlock, to address urgent national issues such as insurgency or economic crises (Nordlinger, 1977).
From a legal perspective, military rule may also be seen as a temporary measure to uphold the rule of law when civilian structures collapse. Emergency powers, often enshrined in national constitutions, allow military forces to assume control under exceptional circumstances. In theory, this ensures the protection of citizens and the state until normalcy is restored. However, the practical application of such powers frequently diverges from their intended purpose, raising questions about the legitimacy of prolonged military governance.
Despite these arguments, the notion of military rule as a ‘superior’ form of government remains problematic. Stability achieved through coercion often comes at the expense of individual freedoms, and the absence of checks and balances undermines the very rule of law that military regimes claim to protect. Indeed, temporary solutions can become entrenched, as seen in historical cases where military rule persists for decades.
The Legal and Democratic Deficits of Military Rule
A central critique of military rule lies in its inherent incompatibility with democratic principles and legal accountability. From a legal standpoint, military regimes often suspend constitutions, dissolve parliaments, and curtail judicial independence, thereby undermining the separation of powers. This creates a governance structure where the military acts as both lawmaker and enforcer, lacking the oversight necessary to prevent abuses of power. Kende (2007) highlights that military rule frequently results in the suppression of dissent, with legal systems being weaponised to silence opposition rather than protect rights (Kende, 2007).
Historical examples illustrate these concerns. In Nigeria, military regimes during the late 20th century, such as those under General Sani Abacha, were marked by widespread human rights violations and the erosion of legal norms. Decrees replaced legislation, and military tribunals supplanted civilian courts, often leading to arbitrary detentions and unfair trials (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Such actions not only violate international legal standards—such as those outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—but also damage the long-term credibility of state institutions.
Furthermore, military rule typically lacks mechanisms for popular participation. Unlike democratic systems, where governance derives legitimacy from the consent of the governed, military regimes rely on force and intimidation. This raises significant questions about their moral and legal authority to govern, particularly over extended periods. While some argue that military rule can pave the way for democratic transitions (as in South Korea during the 1980s), such outcomes are neither guaranteed nor typical.
The Risks of Authoritarianism and Corruption
Another critical issue with military rule is its susceptibility to authoritarianism and corruption. While military governments often justify their rule on the grounds of eliminating corruption in civilian administrations, they are not immune to similar failings. Power concentrated in the hands of a few military leaders can breed nepotism and self-interest, as resources are diverted to maintain loyalty within the armed forces rather than serve the public good. Transparency International’s reports consistently highlight that military-led states, such as Myanmar under junta rule, rank poorly on corruption indices, with little accountability to citizens (Transparency International, 2022).
From a legal perspective, the absence of independent oversight exacerbates these risks. Civilian governments, for all their flaws, are subject to scrutiny through elections, media, and judicial review. Military regimes, by contrast, often operate in opacity, with decrees and decisions shielded from public debate. This environment stifles the development of a robust legal framework and diminishes trust in governance structures over time. Arguably, the short-term gains of order under military rule are outweighed by the long-term costs of institutional decay.
Counterarguments and Contextual Considerations
It is important to acknowledge that military rule may appear effective in specific contexts, particularly in states facing existential threats. For instance, during wartime or severe national emergencies, the centralised decision-making of a military government could enable rapid mobilisation of resources. Historical cases, such as the military-led efforts in post-war reconstruction in some European states, demonstrate that military involvement can sometimes aid recovery. However, these examples typically involve military support under civilian oversight rather than outright military rule.
Moreover, the success of military governance is heavily context-dependent. In nations with strong pre-existing democratic traditions, military rule is likely to face significant resistance and be viewed as illegitimate. In contrast, in regions with a history of political instability, such as parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, military intervention might initially be welcomed as a stabilising force. Nevertheless, even in these contexts, the long-term consequences—such as the suppression of civil liberties and economic stagnation—often outweigh temporary benefits.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while military rule may offer short-term advantages in terms of stability and decisiveness, it is fundamentally flawed as a sustainable form of government. From a legal and political perspective, it undermines democratic accountability, erodes the rule of law, and risks fostering authoritarianism and corruption. Historical evidence, supported by academic analyses, suggests that the costs of military governance—particularly in terms of human rights and institutional integrity—far outweigh its benefits. The implications of this assessment are clear: governance systems must prioritise legitimacy, accountability, and the protection of individual freedoms, qualities that military rule inherently lacks. Therefore, rather than viewing military rule as the ‘best’ form of government, it should be regarded as a temporary and exceptional measure, to be replaced by democratic structures at the earliest opportunity. Future discussions on governance should focus on strengthening civilian institutions to prevent the conditions that lead to military intervention in the first place.
References
- Falola, T. and Heaton, M. (2008) A History of Nigeria. Cambridge University Press.
- Kende, M. S. (2007) Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States. Cambridge University Press.
- Nordlinger, E. A. (1977) Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. Prentice Hall.
- Transparency International (2022) Corruption Perceptions Index 2022. Transparency International.
