Introduction
The philosophy of mind has long grappled with the emergence of subjectivity and the complex phenomenology of the human mind from biological foundations. Peter Godfrey-Smith’s biological framework offers a novel, gradualist approach to understanding subjectivity, rooted in empirical realism rather than abstract metaphysical speculation. This essay explores Godfrey-Smith’s argument that subjectivity begins with minimal, proto-cognitive agency in living organisms and evolves through key transitions, such as the development of nervous systems and perceptual constancy, into the intricate experience of the human mind. While acknowledging the framework’s strengths, including its realism and continuity, this essay critically examines challenges to the neuron-centric view of complex agency and evaluates how Godfrey-Smith bridges the explanatory gap between biology and phenomenology. By drawing on his works from 2016 and 2019, alongside supporting arguments from Burge (2010) and critiques from Calvo Garzón and Keijzer, this essay assesses the theoretical advantages of Godfrey-Smith’s approach over traditional philosophical models like panpsychism. Ultimately, it aims to highlight the framework’s potential to redefine our understanding of the mind while identifying areas where further clarification is needed.
The Gradualist Approach to Subjectivity
Godfrey-Smith’s framework stands out for its commitment to a gradualist model of subjectivity, positing that even the simplest living organisms, such as bacteria and plants, exhibit a form of minimal subjectivity through metabolic processes and adaptive behaviors (Godfrey-Smith, 2016). This perspective challenges traditional views that reserve subjectivity for higher-order beings with complex cognition. By grounding subjectivity in the fundamental struggle against entropy, Godfrey-Smith provides a clear starting point for tracing the evolution of mind. Indeed, his emphasis on life’s active resistance to environmental degradation offers a tangible basis for subjectivity that is absent in inanimate objects, thereby establishing a meaningful boundary for experience.
However, a critical question arises: how does this minimal agency transform into the rich phenomenology of human consciousness? Godfrey-Smith identifies the evolution of nervous systems as a pivotal development, arguing that they enable rapid, precise communication between cells, thus accelerating biological coordination (Godfrey-Smith, 2016). This quantitative enhancement, he suggests, lays the groundwork for more complex forms of agency. Yet, this neuron-centric view faces challenges. Calvo Garzón and Keijzer (2011) point out that plants, lacking nervous systems, display sophisticated adaptive behaviors, such as root tips functioning as ‘brain-like’ command centers with territorial and communicative capacities. This evidence suggests that while nervous systems are significant, they may not be the sole prerequisite for complex agency, prompting a reconsideration of whether qualitative rather than merely quantitative factors underpin the emergence of mind.
From Sensation to Perception: Establishing a Point of View
To address the transition from minimal subjectivity to complex phenomenology, Godfrey-Smith turns to the concept of a ‘point of view’ in his later work (Godfrey-Smith, 2019). Drawing inspiration from Nagel’s framework, he argues that subjectivity is not just about being alive but about possessing a perspective ‘from somewhere’ (Godfrey-Smith, 2019). This notion reinterprets the explanatory gap between physical processes and subjective experience as an ‘ontologically innocent’ product of differing points of view, rather than a fundamental difference in substance. In doing so, Godfrey-Smith offers a unified approach to classic philosophical puzzles, such as Frank Jackson’s ‘Mary the Color Scientist,’ by suggesting that the gap is a natural outcome of experiential perspectives rather than an insurmountable divide.
A key step in this transition, according to Godfrey-Smith, is the emergence of perceptual constancy, a concept elaborated by Burge (2010). Perceptual constancy marks the shift from mere sensation—reactive responses to stimuli—to genuine perception, where organisms interpret sensory input as representing consistent objects in the external world. This development, often facilitated by the mobility of animals, enables the active establishment of boundaries between self and environment, fostering a stable sense of self (Burge, 2010). For instance, an animal navigating its surroundings repeatedly confirms external realities, thus constructing a coherent ‘point of view.’ While this argument is compelling, it remains somewhat unclear how perceptual constancy translates into the full spectrum of human phenomenology, including self-awareness and emotional depth, indicating a need for further exploration of intermediate evolutionary steps.
Theoretical Advantages: Realism and Continuity over Intuition
Godfrey-Smith’s framework offers several theoretical advantages over traditional philosophical models, particularly in its grounding in empirical realism. Unlike classical arguments that rely on ‘logical possibilities’—such as the conceivability of philosophical zombies to challenge materialism—Godfrey-Smith focuses on the ‘material on the table,’ examining the actual history of life (Godfrey-Smith, 2019). He argues that our intuitions about the mind-body problem are unreliable due to our limited understanding of physical processes at the nanoscale. For example, the ‘molecular storm’ within cells reveals a causal holism that defies the mechanistic ‘push-pull’ models (like Leibniz’s mill) that shape our intuitions. By highlighting this mismatch, Godfrey-Smith does not dismiss intuitive objections but explains why they falter, thus reducing the credibility of arguments against materialism based on subjective conceivability (Godfrey-Smith, 2019).
Furthermore, his theory prioritizes biological fact over speculation, establishing a model of evolutionary continuity. Subjectivity, in this view, is not an abrupt or inexplicable addition to the physical world but a feature on a progressive spectrum—a concept Godfrey-Smith terms ‘Biopsychism.’ This stands in contrast to panpsychism, as advanced by Strawson and Goff, which posits consciousness as a universal property of matter, even in inanimate systems like smartphones, if they exhibit sufficient information integration (Tononi, 2012). While panpsychism struggles to delineate boundaries for consciousness, Godfrey-Smith’s Biopsychism anchors experience in the active processes of living organisms, distinguishing them from mere matter. This principled boundary not only narrows the explanatory gap but also offers a more precise alternative to panpsychism’s expansive claims, grounding the self in the tangible reality of biological struggle.
Challenges and Limitations
Despite these strengths, Godfrey-Smith’s framework is not without limitations. The emphasis on nervous systems as accelerators of subjectivity risks underestimating alternative pathways to complex agency, as evidenced by plant behavior (Calvo Garzón and Keijzer, 2011). Additionally, while perceptual constancy marks a significant transition, it remains unclear how this mechanism fully accounts for the qualitative richness of human experience, such as emotions or abstract thought. These gaps suggest that while Godfrey-Smith’s gradualist approach is promising, it requires further elaboration on the specific evolutionary mechanisms and qualitative shifts that bridge minimal subjectivity and complex phenomenology. Arguably, integrating interdisciplinary insights from cognitive science and ethology could strengthen the framework by providing detailed case studies of transitional states in diverse organisms.
Conclusion
In summary, Peter Godfrey-Smith’s biological framework offers a compelling, gradualist perspective on the emergence of subjectivity, grounding it in the empirical realities of life rather than abstract intuition. By tracing the evolution from minimal proto-cognitive agency to complex phenomenology through developments like nervous systems and perceptual constancy, his theory provides a coherent model of continuity that challenges traditional dichotomies in the philosophy of mind. Its theoretical advantages, particularly in realism and boundary-setting, distinguish it from panpsychism and other speculative approaches. However, challenges remain, notably in accounting for non-neuronal pathways to agency and the qualitative depth of human consciousness. These limitations highlight the need for further research into specific evolutionary transitions and interdisciplinary collaboration. Ultimately, Godfrey-Smith’s framework reshapes our understanding of subjectivity, offering a robust foundation for future exploration into the origins of mind and its place in the natural world.
References
- Burge, T. (2010) Origins of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
- Calvo Garzón, P. and Keijzer, F. (2011) Plants and the conceptual articulation of embodied cognition. Cognitive Processing, 12(1), pp. 81-89.
- Godfrey-Smith, P. (2016) Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Godfrey-Smith, P. (2019) Metazoa: Animal Life and the Birth of the Mind. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Tononi, G. (2012) Phi: A Voyage from the Brain to the Soul. Pantheon Books.
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