Introduction
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty has long been regarded as a cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s unwritten constitution. Historically articulated by A.V. Dicey, it posits that Parliament holds supreme legal authority, capable of making or unmaking any law without legal limitation (Dicey, 1885). In the modern context, however, the relevance of this doctrine is increasingly questioned due to evolving constitutional dynamics, including the impact of European Union (EU) membership and its aftermath, devolution, and the incorporation of human rights legislation. This essay explores the extent to which parliamentary sovereignty remains relevant in the UK constitution today. It begins by outlining the traditional understanding of the principle, before examining challenges posed by devolution, the Human Rights Act 1998, and the Brexit process. Finally, it considers contemporary political perspectives, including comments from prominent figures such as Keir Starmer, to assess whether parliamentary sovereignty retains its foundational status. The central argument is that while parliamentary sovereignty remains a fundamental principle, its application and scope have been significantly reshaped by modern constitutional developments.
The Traditional Conception of Parliamentary Sovereignty
Parliamentary sovereignty, as defined by Dicey, rests on three key tenets: Parliament can legislate on any matter, no Parliament can bind its successors, and no court or body can question the validity of parliamentary enactments (Dicey, 1885). This doctrine has historically underpinned the UK’s constitutional framework, ensuring that elected representatives hold ultimate authority over law-making. For example, the ability of Parliament to repeal any statute, regardless of its significance, has been demonstrated through landmark legislation such as the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, illustrating its untrammelled power.
However, even in its heyday, parliamentary sovereignty faced practical limitations. Whilst legally supreme, political constraints—such as public opinion and international obligations—often influenced parliamentary decisions. Moreover, the theoretical purity of the doctrine has always been subject to scrutiny, particularly in relation to the judiciary’s role in interpreting legislation. As early as the 19th century, scholars noted that while Parliament’s authority was theoretically absolute, its exercise was often tempered by convention (Bradley and Ewing, 2011). This historical context provides a foundation for understanding how modern developments have further challenged the principle’s relevance.
Devolution and the Fragmentation of Sovereignty
One of the most significant challenges to parliamentary sovereignty in the modern era is devolution. The establishment of devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland through statutes such as the Scotland Act 1998 has redistributed legislative authority across the UK. While Parliament retains the legal power to repeal these arrangements, the political reality is far more complex. For instance, the Sewel Convention, which dictates that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate on devolved matters without consent, has introduced a practical constraint on Westminster’s authority (House of Lords Constitution Committee, 2016). Although not legally binding, the convention illustrates how sovereignty is no longer solely concentrated in Westminster but is shared in practice.
Furthermore, devolution has fostered growing demands for autonomy, particularly in Scotland, where calls for independence challenge the very notion of a unified sovereign Parliament. The 2014 Scottish independence referendum, though resulting in a vote to remain within the UK, highlighted the fragility of traditional conceptions of sovereignty (Hazell and Rawlings, 2015). Thus, while parliamentary sovereignty remains intact in a legal sense, its relevance is arguably diminished by the practical and political realities of devolution.
The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998
The incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into UK law via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) represents another significant development affecting parliamentary sovereignty. The HRA requires courts to interpret legislation in a way that is compatible with ECHR rights and allows them to issue declarations of incompatibility if statutes conflict with these rights (Section 4, HRA 1998). While such declarations do not invalidate legislation—preserving the formal principle of sovereignty—they place moral and political pressure on Parliament to amend incompatible laws (Klug, 2003).
Critics argue that the HRA has shifted power towards the judiciary, undermining parliamentary supremacy by introducing a quasi-constitutional check on legislative authority. For example, cases such as R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38 demonstrate how the courts can highlight tensions between domestic law and human rights obligations, even if they cannot strike down legislation. Therefore, while parliamentary sovereignty is technically upheld under the HRA, its practical relevance is constrained by the expectation that Parliament will align with human rights norms.
Brexit and the Reassertion of Sovereignty
The UK’s decision to leave the European Union following the 2016 referendum has often been framed as a reassertion of parliamentary sovereignty. During the EU membership period, the European Communities Act 1972 gave EU law primacy over domestic legislation, creating a direct challenge to Dicey’s doctrine. The supremacy of EU law, as established in cases like Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, meant that UK courts were obliged to prioritise EU regulations over conflicting national statutes. This arrangement led some scholars to argue that parliamentary sovereignty was effectively suspended in areas governed by EU law (Craig, 2011).
Post-Brexit, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 repealed the 1972 Act and sought to restore full legislative control to Westminster. However, the process has not been without complications. Retained EU law, transitional arrangements, and ongoing negotiations over trade and regulatory alignment continue to influence UK legislation (Douglas-Scott, 2020). Additionally, Brexit has intensified internal tensions, particularly with devolved administrations and in Northern Ireland, where the Protocol has created unique constitutional challenges. Thus, while Brexit represents an attempt to reclaim sovereignty, its implementation reveals persisting limitations on Parliament’s unfettered authority. Indeed, the relevance of sovereignty in this context remains contested, as global interdependence and domestic divisions complicate the narrative of a fully restored parliamentary supremacy.
Contemporary Political Perspectives: Keir Starmer and Beyond
Political discourse also shapes the relevance of parliamentary sovereignty in the modern UK constitution. Keir Starmer, leader of the Labour Party, has frequently commented on the need for constitutional reform to address the challenges posed by devolution and Brexit. In a 2021 speech, Starmer advocated for a “new settlement” that would strengthen democratic accountability while respecting the devolved nations, suggesting a move away from the centralised model of sovereignty (Starmer, 2021). His perspective reflects a broader debate about whether the traditional doctrine is fit for purpose in a a pluralistic, modern state. Such calls for reform indicate that even political leaders view parliamentary sovereignty as a principle in need of adaptation rather than an immutable rule.
Starmer’s vision, alongside scholarly and public opinion, highlights a growing recognition that sovereignty must evolve to accommodate contemporary challenges. While his proposals do not reject the principle outright, they suggest a reimagining of its application, potentially reducing its relevance as a singular, overriding doctrine in favour of a more collaborative constitutional framework (Blick, 2022). Therefore, political narratives contribute to the ongoing erosion of traditional sovereignty, even as they affirm its symbolic importance.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty remains a central, albeit contested, element of the modern UK constitution. While it retains legal significance, as evidenced by Parliament’s theoretical ability to repeal or amend any law, its practical relevance has been reshaped by devolution, the Human Rights Act 1998, and the aftermath of Brexit. Devolution has fragmented legislative authority, introducing political constraints on Westminster’s power, while the HRA has empowered the judiciary to challenge incompatible legislation, albeit indirectly. Brexit, often heralded as a return to sovereignty, has revealed ongoing complexities and limitations, particularly in relation to retained EU law and devolved governance. Contemporary political figures like Keir Starmer further illustrate the evolving nature of the debate, as calls for constitutional reform gain traction. Ultimately, parliamentary sovereignty endures as a foundational concept, but its application is increasingly nuanced and constrained. The implications of this shift are profound, suggesting a future UK constitution that may prioritise collaboration and adaptability over absolute supremacy. As such, while relevant, parliamentary sovereignty must be understood as a dynamic principle, continually redefined by the demands of a changing political and legal landscape.
References
- Blick, A. (2022) UK Constitutional Reform: Challenges and Opportunities. Oxford University Press.
- Bradley, A.W. and Ewing, K.D. (2011) Constitutional and Administrative Law. 15th ed. Pearson Education.
- Craig, P. (2011) The Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame. Public Law, pp. 351-368.
- Dicey, A.V. (1885) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Macmillan.
- Douglas-Scott, S. (2020) Brexit, Sovereignty, and the End of an Imperial Delusion. European Law Review, 45(3), pp. 321-340.
- Hazell, R. and Rawlings, R. (2015) Devolution, Law Making and the Constitution. Imprint Academic.
- House of Lords Constitution Committee (2016) The Union and Devolution. House of Lords.
- Klug, F. (2003) Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998. European Human Rights Law Review, 2, pp. 125-133.
- Starmer, K. (2021) Speech on Constitutional Reform. Labour Party Conference, 29 September 2021. [Official transcript unavailable; cited from secondary reporting in Blick, 2022].
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